CVE-2026-34400
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedAlerta is a monitoring tool. Prior to version 9.1.0, the Query string search API (q=) was vulnerable to SQL injection via the Postgres query parser, which built WHERE clauses by interpolating user-supplied search terms directly into SQL strings via f-strings. This issue has been patched in version 9.1.0.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceAlerta monitoring tool versions prior to 9.1.0 contain a SQL injection vulnerability in the Query string search API (q= parameter). The Postgres query parser constructs WHERE clauses by directly interpolating user-supplied search terms into SQL strings using f-strings, allowing unauthenticated attackers to inject arbitrary SQL commands.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data< 9.1.0CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
-
Identify installed Alerta versionRun 'alerta --version' or check the package manager (pip show alerta, docker image inspect, or package.json) to find the running version of AlertaAffected if The installed version is less than 9.1.0
-
Confirm Postgres backend is in useCheck the Alerta configuration file (alertad.conf or environment variables) for the DATABASE_URL or database settings - verify the backend is PostgreSQLAffected if Postgres is the active database backend (this vulnerability affects only the Postgres query parser)
-
Verify API is accessible with q= parameterTest accessing the Alerta API endpoint with a query string parameter, such as GET /alerts?q=test - check if the API responds to the q= parameterAffected if The API accepts the q= parameter and returns results (indicates the vulnerable code path is reachable)
-
Inspect query parser code for direct interpolationLocate the Postgres query parser source file (typically in /alertad or the Python package) and search for f-string SQL construction patterns like f"WHERE...{user_input}" or similar string interpolation in query building logicAffected if The code uses f-strings or string concatenation to embed the q= parameter directly into SQL WHERE clauses without parameterization
You are affected if running Alerta versions below 9.1.0 with a Postgres backend that exposes the q= parameter API endpoint, and the query parser code uses direct string interpolation for SQL construction.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scoped9.1.0
Upgrade to Alerta version 9.1.0 or later which implements parameterized queries. If immediate patching is not feasible, restrict or disable the Query string search API and/or deploy a WAF to filter SQL injection patterns.
9.1.0
- 1. Identify the current Alerta version by checking the running application or installed package
- 2. Back up the Alerta database and configuration files before proceeding with the upgrade
- 3. Upgrade Alerta to version 9.1.0 or later using the appropriate installation method (pip, docker, or package manager)
- 4. Verify the upgrade was successful by checking the installed Alerta version
- 5. Test the Query string search API (q=) parameter to confirm the SQL injection vulnerability is patched
- 6. Restart the Alerta service to ensure the new version is fully operational
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
- Consultation2.0 h
- Implementation4.0 h
- Testing3.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $3,088.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2026-34400 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-34400 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
Be the first to add a field note for this CVE — a mitigation you’ve verified, a version caveat, or a link to a working fix. Sign in above to contribute.
A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.
- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data