CVE-2026-3567
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedThe RepairBuddy – Repair Shop CRM & Booking Plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to unauthorized access in all versions up to, and including, 4.1132. The plugin exposes two AJAX handlers that, when combined, allow any authenticated user to modify admin-level plugin settings. First, the wc_rb_get_fresh_nonce() function (registered via wp_ajax and wp_ajax_nopriv hooks) allows any user to generate a valid WordPress nonce for any arbitrary action name by simply providing the nonce_name parameter, with no capability checks. Second, the wc_rep_shop_settings_submission() function only verifies the nonce (wcrb_main_setting_nonce) but performs no current_user_can() capability check before updating 15+ plugin options via update_option(). This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with subscriber-level access and above, to modify all plugin configuration settings including business name, email, logo, menu label, GDPR settings, and more by first minting a valid nonce via the wc_rb_get_fresh_nonce endpoint and then calling the settings submission handler.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceThe RepairBuddy WordPress plugin exposes two AJAX endpoints that together allow privilege escalation. The wc_rb_get_fresh_nonce() function (accessible to unauthenticated users via wp_ajax_nopriv) generates valid WordPress nonces for any action without capability checks. The wc_rep_shop_settings_submission() function then accepts this nonce but lacks current_user_can() validation, allowing any authenticated user (subscriber+) to modify 15+ plugin settings including business name, email, logo, and GDPR configuration.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- None
- Integrity
- Low
- Availability
- None
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Verify RepairBuddy plugin is installedCheck the WordPress plugins directory or use WP-CLI: wp plugin list --search='repairbuddy' or inspect /wp-content/plugins/ for a repairbuddy folderAffected if The RepairBuddy plugin is present in the WordPress installation
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Check if AJAX endpoint wc_rb_get_fresh_nonce is registered for unauthenticated accessSearch plugin source code for 'wp_ajax_nopriv_wc_rb_get_fresh_nonce' or inspect the plugin's main PHP file for add_action('wp_ajax_nopriv_wc_rb_get_fresh_nonce', ...)Affected if The wp_ajax_nopriv hook is registered for wc_rb_get_fresh_nonce, allowing unauthenticated nonce generation
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Inspect wc_rep_shop_settings_submission for capability checksLocate the wc_rep_shop_settings_submission function in the plugin code and search for 'current_user_can' or 'manage_options' within that functionAffected if No current_user_can() check is performed before processing settings updates
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Check for exposed plugin settings that can be modifiedIdentify if the plugin handles update_option calls for settings like business name, email, logo, or GDPR options - look for the settings array or form submission handlersAffected if The plugin processes update_option calls without verifying user capabilities
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Confirm user role accessReview if any authenticated user with subscriber-level access can trigger the settings update endpoint - check the AJAX action registration for wc_rep_shop_settings_submissionAffected if The settings submission endpoint is accessible to subscriber-level users or below without proper authorization
The environment is affected if the RepairBuddy plugin is installed AND the wc_rb_get_fresh_nonce AJAX endpoint is hooked to wp_ajax_nopriv AND the wc_rep_shop_settings_submission function lacks current_user_can() validation before processing settings.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataAdd capability checks (e.g., current_user_can('manage_options')) to wc_rep_shop_settings_submission() before processing update_option() calls, and restrict wc_rb_get_fresh_nonce() to authenticated users with appropriate privileges or remove the wp_ajax_nopriv hook registration.
- Consultation1.0 h
- Implementation2.0 h
- Testing1.0 h
- Review / QA1.0 h
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Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2026-3567 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-3567 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data