CVE-2026-3576
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedThe Planyo Online Reservation System plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Server-Side Request Forgery leading to Local File Inclusion in all versions up to, and including, 3.0. The ulap.php file acts as an AJAX proxy and is directly accessible without WordPress bootstrapping or any authentication. The send_http_post() function validates the host of the provided URL against an allowlist that includes 'localhost', but critically fails to validate the URL scheme/protocol. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to supply a file:// URL (e.g., file://localhost/etc/passwd) which bypasses the host allowlist check because parse_url() returns 'localhost' as the host. The URL is then passed to curl_init() or fopen(), both of which support the file:// protocol, allowing the attacker to read arbitrary local files on the server and have their contents returned in the HTTP response. This can lead to disclosure of sensitive files such as /etc/passwd, wp-config.php (containing database credentials and authentication keys), and other server-side files.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceThe Planyo Online Reservation System plugin for WordPress contains an SSRF-to-LFI vulnerability in ulap.php. The send_http_post() function validates the host against an allowlist (including 'localhost') but fails to validate the URL scheme, allowing file:// URLs to bypass the check since parse_url() returns 'localhost' as host for file://localhost/etc/passwd. Both curl_init() and fopen() support file://, enabling unauthenticated attackers to read arbitrary local files.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Changed
- Confidentiality
- Low
- Integrity
- Low
- Availability
- None
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Confirm Planyo plugin installationCheck for the Planyo plugin in wp-content/plugins/ directory or via WordPress admin plugins listAffected if Planyo Online Reservation System plugin is installed
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Locate vulnerable ulap.php fileSearch for ulap.php in the Planyo plugin directory (wp-content/plugins/planyo/ or similar)Affected if ulap.php file exists in the Planyo plugin folder
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Verify vulnerable function existsSearch within ulap.php for the send_http_post() function and parse_url() usageAffected if send_http_post() function is present and uses parse_url() without scheme validation
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Check plugin versionRead plugin version from planyo.php header or readme.txtAffected if Version is unpatched or unknown (no fixed version confirmed)
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Test URL scheme validation (if safe to do)Examine send_http_post() code to confirm file:// protocol is not blocked before allowlist checkAffected if Code allows file:// URLs to pass through without scheme validation
If the Planyo plugin is installed, ulap.php exists, and the send_http_post() function lacks URL scheme validation, the environment is affected by this SSRF-to-LFI vulnerability.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataUpdate to a patched version of the Planyo plugin that properly validates URL schemes and blocks file:// protocol. If no update is available, restrict access to ulap.php or temporarily disable the plugin until a fix is released.
- Consultation2.0 h
- Implementation3.0 h
- Testing2.0 h
- Review / QA1.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $2,272.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2026-3576 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sources- plugins.trac.wordpress.org
- plugins.trac.wordpress.org
- plugins.trac.wordpress.org
- plugins.trac.wordpress.org
- plugins.trac.wordpress.org
- plugins.trac.wordpress.org
- plugins.trac.wordpress.org
- plugins.trac.wordpress.org
- plugins.trac.wordpress.org
- plugins.trac.wordpress.org
- plugins.trac.wordpress.org
- www.wordfence.com
- nvd.nist.gov
Practitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-3576 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.
- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data