CVE-2026-3595
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedThe Riaxe Product Customizer plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to authorization bypass in all versions up to, and including, 2.1.2. This is due to the plugin registering a REST API route at POST /wp-json/InkXEProductDesignerLite/customer/delete_customer without a permission_callback, causing WordPress to default to allowing unauthenticated access, and the inkxe_delete_customer() callback function taking an array of user IDs from the request body and passing each one directly to wp_delete_user() without any authentication or authorization checks. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to delete arbitrary WordPress user accounts, including administrator accounts, leading to complete site lockout and data loss.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceThe Riaxe Product Customizer WordPress plugin registers a REST API route at POST /wp-json/InkXEProductDesignerLite/customer/delete_customer without a permission_callback, causing WordPress to default to allowing unauthenticated access. The inkxe_delete_customer() callback function accepts an array of user IDs from the request body and passes each directly to wp_delete_user() without any authentication or authorization checks, enabling unauthenticated attackers to delete arbitrary user accounts including administrators.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- None
- Integrity
- Low
- Availability
- None
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Confirm the Riaxe Product Customizer plugin is installedCheck for the plugin directory at wp-content/plugins/inkxe-product-designer-lite or list installed plugins via WordPress admin or wp-cli: wp plugin list --search=inkxeAffected if The plugin directory exists in the WordPress installation
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Determine the installed plugin versionRead the plugin header from inkxe-product-designer-lite.php or check the version via WordPress admin Plugins pageAffected if Any version of the plugin is installed (no patched version has been identified)
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Verify the vulnerable REST API endpoint is exposedSend a POST request to /wp-json/InkXEProductDesignerLite/customer/delete_customer using a tool like curl or Burp Suite. Include a JSON body with a user ID, for example: {"user_id": 1}. Observe whether the server accepts the request without returning a 401 or 403 authentication errorAffected if The endpoint accepts the request without requiring authentication (returns 200 or other non-401/403 response)
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Confirm the endpoint lacks authorization checksIf the endpoint responds, examine whether the user is actually deleted by querying the WordPress users database or attempting to log in with the target user IDAffected if The user ID provided in the request is deleted from the WordPress database without any authentication
If the Riaxe Product Customizer plugin is present and the /wp-json/InkXEProductDesignerLite/customer/delete_customer endpoint accepts unauthenticated requests to delete users, the environment is affected by CVE-2026-3595
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataDisable the plugin or block the vulnerable /wp-json/InkXEProductDesignerLite/customer/delete_customer endpoint at the web server level until a patched version is available that adds proper permission_callback and authorization checks.
- Consultation2.0 h
- Implementation2.0 h
- Testing2.0 h
- Review / QA1.0 h
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Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2026-3595 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-3595 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
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