CVE-2026-3655
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedThe OTP Login With Phone Number, OTP Verification plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to authentication bypass in versions 1.8.50 through 1.8.60. This is due to the Firebase verification flow in the `lwp_ajax_register` AJAX handler not binding the Firebase session to the phone number supplied in the request. The `idehweb_lwp_activate_through_firebase()` function validates that a Firebase OTP session is legitimate, but the `phoneNumber` returned by Firebase is never compared against the victim's stored phone number. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to authenticate as any user who has a phone number stored in user meta, including administrators, by verifying their own Firebase session and supplying the victim's phone number in the same request.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceThe OTP Login With Phone Number plugin fails to validate that the phone number returned by Firebase OTP verification matches the phone number stored for the target user. The `idehweb_lwp_activate_through_firebase()` function validates the Firebase session is legitimate but doesn't compare the Firebase-returned phone number against the victim's stored phone number in user meta, allowing unauthenticated attackers to authenticate as any user by supplying the victim's phone number while validating their own Firebase session.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify the Firebase phone authentication pluginCheck WordPress plugin directory for any installed plugin that provides Firebase OTP or phone number authentication. Common plugin names include 'Firebase Auth', 'Firebase Phone Auth', or similar. List all installed plugins using wp-cli or inspect /wp-content/plugins/Affected if Any Firebase-based phone authentication plugin for WordPress is installed and active
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Check the plugin versionIf a Firebase phone authentication plugin is found, check its version number against the affected range. The vulnerability affects versions prior to 1.8.61. Access via WordPress admin plugin page or inspect the plugin's main PHP file for version commentAffected if Installed version is lower than 1.8.61 (or the specific version the patch was released for)
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Verify Firebase phone verification is enabledInspect the plugin settings in WordPress admin under the plugin configuration page. Look for options related to phone number verification, OTP verification, or Firebase authentication methods. Check wp_options table for relevant configuration keys if direct admin access is unavailableAffected if Firebase phone/OTP verification method is enabled and configured
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Confirm user phone numbers are storedQuery the WordPress usermeta table for records containing phone number fields. Common meta keys include 'phone', 'mobile', 'billing_phone', or plugin-specific meta. Run: SELECT * FROM wp_usermeta WHERE meta_key LIKE '%phone%'Affected if WordPress users have phone numbers stored in their profile metadata that could be targeted for impersonation
If a Firebase phone authentication plugin version below 1.8.61 is installed with phone verification enabled and users have phone numbers stored, the environment is vulnerable to authentication bypass via phone number mismatch.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scopedUpdate to version 1.8.61 or later which adds proper phone number binding validation. Until patched, consider disabling phone-based authentication or restricting access via firewall rules.
Version 1.8.61 or latest available version
- 1. Navigate to the WordPress admin dashboard
- 2. Go to Plugins > Installed Plugins
- 3. Locate the 'OTP Login With Phone Number, OTP Verification' plugin
- 4. Check the current version number to confirm it is between 1.8.50 and 1.8.60 (vulnerable range)
- 5. If vulnerable, click 'Update Now' to install the latest version
- 6. Alternatively, manually download the updated plugin from wordpress.org and reinstall
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
- Consultation2.0 h
- Implementation1.0 h
- Testing2.0 h
- Review / QA1.0 h
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Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2026-3655 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-3655 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data