CVE-2026-36616
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedMercusys AC12G (EU) V1 with firmware AC12G(EU)_V1_200909 contains hardcoded WiFi driver credentials including a RADIUS shared secret, WPS test key, and default PSK embedded in the production firmware binary.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · moderate confidenceThe Mercusys AC12G V1 firmware contains hardcoded WiFi driver credentials including a RADIUS shared secret, WPS test key, and default PSK embedded in the production binary. These credentials can be extracted by analyzing the firmware and potentially allow unauthorized WiFi network access or RADIUS authentication bypass.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Adjacent
- Complexity
- High
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- Low
- Availability
- None
CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify device model and firmware versionAccess the router web interface (typically 192.168.0.1) or check the device label. Look for model number AC12G and hardware version V1. Check the firmware version in the admin panel under System or Administration settings.Affected if Device is a Mercusys AC12G V1 with any firmware version (hardcoded credentials are embedded in production firmware)
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Obtain the firmware binaryDownload the official firmware update file from the Mercusys support website for the AC12G V1. Use binwalk or similar tools to extract the filesystem and driver components from the .bin firmware file.Affected if Firmware binary is obtained for further inspection
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Search firmware for hardcoded RADIUS shared secretUse strings grep or binwalk to extract readable strings from the firmware binary. Search for patterns resembling RADIUS shared secrets (typically alphanumeric strings of 16+ characters near RADIUS, secret, or shared keywords).Affected if A readable RADIUS shared secret is found embedded in the firmware binary that cannot be changed through the web interface
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Search firmware for hardcoded WPS test keyExtract strings from the WiFi driver section of the firmware. Search for WPS-related strings, test keys, or default WPS PINs that persist after configuration changes.Affected if A WPS test key or default WPS PIN is found hardcoded in the WiFi driver portion of the firmware
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Search firmware for hardcoded default PSKSearch the firmware binary for pre-shared key patterns, particularly near WiFi configuration sections. Check if the default PSK appears as a static string that does not change when users configure their own WiFi password through the admin interface.Affected if A default PSK is found hardcoded in the firmware that persists regardless of web interface password changes
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Verify credentials cannot be changedAccess the router admin panel, navigate to Wireless settings, and attempt to change the WiFi password and WPS settings. Then extract the firmware again and verify if the previously identified hardcoded credentials still exist unchanged in the binary.Affected if The hardcoded credentials in the firmware remain unchanged after attempting to modify WiFi settings through the normal configuration interface
If the device is a Mercusys AC12G V1 router and the firmware binary contains embedded RADIUS secrets, WPS test keys, or default PSK values that persist and cannot be altered through the standard web interface, the environment is affected by this vulnerability.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataContact Mercusys for a firmware update that removes hardcoded credentials. In the interim, implement network segmentation, monitor for unauthorized access using extracted credentials, and consider replacing affected devices if no update is available.
- Consultation4.0 h
- Implementation8.0 h
- Testing6.0 h
- Review / QA4.0 h
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References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-36616 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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