CVE-2026-37430
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedAn arbitrary file upload vulnerability in the ShopOrderImportController.java component of qihang-wms commit 75c15a allows attackers to execute arbitrary code via uploading a crafted file.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · moderate confidenceAn arbitrary file upload vulnerability exists in the ShopOrderImportController.java component of the qihang-wms warehouse management system. Attackers can upload crafted files containing malicious code through the order import functionality, leading to arbitrary code execution on the server.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- Low
- Integrity
- Low
- Availability
- Low
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify if qihang-wms is deployedSearch for the application deployment directory or check running processes for qihang-wms. Look for typical Java web application structures (WAR files, deployment folders) containing 'wms' or 'qihang' in the path.Affected if The system is running the qihang-wms warehouse management application.
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Locate ShopOrderImportController.javaSearch the application source code or decompiled classes for the file ShopOrderImportController.java. In deployed applications, look for the class name in the compiled bytecode under paths like WEB-INF/classes or in JAR files.Affected if The ShopOrderImportController component exists in the deployment.
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Verify order import functionality is accessibleCheck if the order import endpoint is exposed. Typical paths include /order/import, /shoporder/import, or similar URL patterns. Review web.xml or application routing configuration to confirm the endpoint is mapped and accessible.Affected if The order import endpoint is publicly or internally accessible without additional authentication barriers.
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Review file upload configurationExamine the application's configuration files (application.properties, application.yml, or web.xml) for upload-related settings. Check if file type validation is implemented in the ShopOrderImportController code itself.Affected if File type validation is missing, weak, or relies solely on file extension rather than content inspection.
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Check upload directory configurationReview deployment configuration to determine where uploaded files are stored. Check if uploads are placed within the webroot and if script execution is enabled in that directory.Affected if Uploaded files are stored inside the webroot and the directory allows script execution.
If qihang-wms is deployed with the ShopOrderImportController component and the order import feature is accessible, the system is likely vulnerable to arbitrary file upload.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataImplement strict file type validation (allowlist approach), verify file content/magic bytes, store uploads outside the webroot with randomized filenames, and disable script execution in the upload directory.
- Consultation4.0 h
- Implementation8.0 h
- Testing4.0 h
- Review / QA3.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2026-37430 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-37430 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
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