CVE-2026-3893
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedThe Carlson VASCO-B GNSS Receiver lacks an authentication mechanism, allowing an attacker with network access to directly access and modify its configuration and operational functions without needing credentials.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceThe Carlson VASCO-B GNSS Receiver has no authentication mechanism at all, allowing any attacker with network access to directly reach the device and modify its configuration and operational functions without any credentials. This is a complete authentication bypass on a network-exposed industrial device.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- Low
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Confirm device modelIdentify the Carlson VASCO-B GNSS Receiver on the network by checking device hostname, MAC OUI (if available), or SNMP sysDescr. Access the device web interface and verify the model displays as VASCO-B.Affected if The device is a Carlson VASCO-B GNSS Receiver and is accessible on the network.
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Check web interface accessibilityOpen a browser and navigate to the device IP address on HTTP/HTTPS ports (commonly 80/443 or vendor-default ports). Observe whether the management interface loads without presenting a login prompt or credentials request.Affected if The management interface loads immediately without requiring any username or password.
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Test API endpoints for authentication bypassSend HTTP GET requests to common API endpoints (such as /api/status, /api/config, or /cgi-bin/) using curl or a similar tool. Include no authentication headers and observe whether the device returns sensitive data or allows configuration changes.Affected if The device returns configuration data or accepts configuration changes without any authentication token or session.
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Verify network exposureUse network scanning tools (nmap, netstat) to determine if the device has listening services on exposed network segments accessible from untrusted networks rather than only from a management VLAN.Affected if The device management ports are reachable from network segments other than a dedicated management network.
If the Carlson VASCO-B GNSS Receiver is network-accessible and its web interface or API returns data or accepts commands without any authentication challenge, the environment is affected by this vulnerability.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataIsolate the device on a restricted network segment with firewall rules limiting access to authorized management stations only, and contact Carlson for a firmware patch to add authentication capabilities.
- Consultation6.0 h
- Implementation8.0 h
- Testing4.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2026-3893 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-3893 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data