CVE-2026-39831
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedThe Verify() method for FIDO/U2F security key types ([email protected], [email protected]) did not check the User Presence flag. Signatures generated without physical touch were accepted, allowing unattended use of a hardware security key. To restore the previous behavior, return a "no-touch-required" extension in Permissions.Extensions from PublicKeyCallback.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceOpenSSH's Verify() method for FIDO/U2F security key types ([email protected] and [email protected]) failed to validate the User Presence flag, allowing signatures to be accepted without physical touch of the security key. This critical flaw enables unattended use of hardware security keys, completely undermining their physical authentication guarantee.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data< 0.52.0CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- None
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Check Golang crypto library versionRun 'go list -m all | grep golang.org/x/crypto' or check go.mod for 'golang.org/x/crypto' version entryAffected if The version is less than 0.52.0 (e.g., 0.51.0, 0.50.0, etc.)
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Verify OpenSSH uses FIDO/U2F security keysCheck SSH configuration files (~/.ssh/authorized_keys) for key types containing 'sk-' prefix such as '[email protected]' or '[email protected]'Affected if Any authorized_keys entries use the sk-* FIDO/U2F key types
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Confirm FIDO/U2F key is hardware-backedInspect the full public key blob in authorized_keys or run 'ssh-keygen -l -f <public_key_file>' to verify it is a FIDO/WebAuthn security key (look for 'ontoken' or 'resident' indicators in key comments)Affected if The key is a hardware security key (not a software/mock implementation)
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Check if OpenSSH binary links to vulnerable crypto libraryRun 'ldd $(which ssh) | grep crypto' or 'otool -L $(which ssh) | grep crypto' on macOS to check linked crypto library version, or inspect the Go application's dependenciesAffected if The linked or bundled golang.org/x/crypto library version is below 0.52.0
You are affected if your environment uses Golang Crypto version below 0.52.0 with OpenSSH configured to accept FIDO/U2F hardware security key authentication using [email protected] or [email protected] key types.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scoped0.52.0
Apply the vendor patch to restore proper User Presence flag verification, or if using a custom implementation, ensure the Verify() method returns the 'no-touch-required' extension in Permissions.Extensions from PublicKeyCallback to explicitly indicate when touch is not required.
golang.org/x/crypto v0.52.0 or later
- Update the golang.org/x/crypto dependency to version 0.52.0 or later by running: go get golang.org/x/[email protected]
- Run go mod tidy to update go.mod and go.sum files
- Verify the update by running: go list -m golang.org/x/crypto
- Rebuild and test the application to ensure the upgrade does not break existing functionality
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
- Consultation3.0 h
- Implementation6.0 h
- Testing8.0 h
- Review / QA3.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2026-39831 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-39831 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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