CVE-2026-40072
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedweb3.py allows you to interact with the Ethereum blockchain using Python. From 6.0.0b3 to before 7.15.0 and 8.0.0b2, web3.py implements CCIP Read / OffchainLookup (EIP-3668) by performing HTTP requests to URLs supplied by smart contracts in offchain_lookup_payload["urls"]. The implementation uses these contract-supplied URLs directly (after {sender} / {data} template substitution) without any destination validation. CCIP Read is enabled by default (global_ccip_read_enabled = True on all providers), meaning any application using web3.py's .call() method is exposed without explicit opt-in. This results in Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) when web3.py is used in backend services, indexers, APIs, or any environment that performs eth_call / .call() against untrusted or user-supplied contract addresses. A malicious contract can force the web3.py process to issue HTTP requests to arbitrary destinations, including internal network services and cloud metadata endpoints. This vulnerability is fixed in 7.15.0 and 8.0.0b2.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysisThe server can be induced to make requests to a URL an attacker controls, turning it into a proxy into internal networks and cloud metadata services. It's especially dangerous behind a trusted network boundary. The fix is strict allow-listing of destinations and blocking access to internal address ranges.
General guidance for the server-side request forgery (ssrf) class — the official description and references above are authoritative for this specific CVE. Want a bespoke review and a reviewed fix? Ask our team →
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data>= 6.1.0, < 7.15.0= 6.0.0= 8.0.0CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Changed
- Confidentiality
- Low
- Integrity
- Low
- Availability
- None
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scoped7.15.0
7.15.0 (or 8.0.0b2 if using the 8.x beta branch)
- Check the current version of web3.py installed by running: pip show web3 or pip list | grep web3
- Upgrade web3.py to version 7.15.0 or later by running: pip install web3==7.15.0 (or pip install --upgrade web3 for the latest stable version)
- If using version 8.x beta, upgrade to version 8.0.0b2 or later: pip install web3==8.0.0b2
- Verify the upgrade was successful by running: pip show web3
- Test your application to ensure the upgrade does not break existing functionality
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2026-40072 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-40072 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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