CVE-2026-4076
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedThe Slider Bootstrap Carousel plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Stored Cross-Site Scripting via the 'category' and 'template' shortcode attributes in all versions up to and including 1.0.7. This is due to insufficient input sanitization and output escaping on user-supplied shortcode attributes. The plugin uses extract() on shortcode_atts() to parse attributes, then directly outputs the $category variable into multiple HTML attributes (id, data-target, href) on lines 38, 47, 109, and 113 without applying esc_attr(). Similarly, the $template attribute flows into a class attribute on line 93 without escaping. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Contributor-level access and above, to inject arbitrary web scripts in pages that will execute whenever a user accesses an injected page.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceThe Slider Bootstrap Carousel WordPress plugin fails to sanitize and escape the 'category' and 'template' shortcode attributes before outputting them into HTML attributes (id, data-target, href, class). An authenticated attacker with Contributor-level access can inject malicious JavaScript via these attributes that executes when users view the affected pages.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Changed
- Confidentiality
- Low
- Integrity
- Low
- Availability
- None
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Confirm Slider Bootstrap Carousel plugin is installedGo to WordPress admin > Plugins and look for 'Slider Bootstrap Carousel' in the installed plugins listAffected if Plugin is not installed on the WordPress site
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Identify the installed plugin versionClick on the plugin in the WordPress plugins list to view details, or check the plugin files for a version number in the main PHP file headerAffected if Unable to determine version OR version is unknown/older than patched release
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Search for shortcode usage in contentUse WordPress search or a database query to find posts/pages containing the shortcode '[slider_bootstrap_carousel' or similar shortcode tags the plugin registersAffected if Shortcode is present in any published content
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Inspect shortcode attribute values in databaseExamine the stored shortcode in posts table (wp_posts) or via plugin editor to check if 'category' or 'template' attributes contain unsanitized user inputAffected if Shortcode attributes contain potentially malicious scripts or unexpected characters
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Check for existing XSS payloads in contentSearch post content for patterns like 'javascript:', 'onerror=', 'onload=', or other script injection attempts within shortcode attributesAffected if Malicious JavaScript payloads are found in shortcode attribute values
User is affected if the Slider Bootstrap Carousel plugin is installed with an unpatched version AND the vulnerable shortcode is being used with user-controllable category or template attributes that could contain malicious script tags.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataUpdate to a patched version that properly escapes shortcode attributes using esc_attr() before output. Until patched, audit existing content for malicious shortcodes and consider restricting shortcode usage permissions.
- Consultation2.0 h
- Implementation3.0 h
- Testing2.0 h
- Review / QA1.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $2,272.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2026-4076 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sources- plugins.trac.wordpress.org
- plugins.trac.wordpress.org
- plugins.trac.wordpress.org
- plugins.trac.wordpress.org
- plugins.trac.wordpress.org
- plugins.trac.wordpress.org
- plugins.trac.wordpress.org
- plugins.trac.wordpress.org
- plugins.trac.wordpress.org
- plugins.trac.wordpress.org
- plugins.trac.wordpress.org
- plugins.trac.wordpress.org
- www.wordfence.com
- nvd.nist.gov
Practitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-4076 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data