CVE-2026-40923
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedTekton Pipelines project provides k8s-style resources for declaring CI/CD-style pipelines. Starting in version 1.0.0 and prior to versions 1.0.2, 1.3.4, 1.6.2, 1.9.3, and 1.11.1, a validation bypass in the VolumeMount path restriction allows mounting volumes under restricted /tekton/ internal paths by using .. path traversal components. The restriction check uses strings.HasPrefix without filepath.Clean, so a path like /tekton/home/../results passes validation but resolves to /tekton/results at runtime. Versions 1.0.2, 1.3.4, 1.6.2, 1.9.3, and 1.11.1 fix the issue.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceThe validation for VolumeMount paths in Tekton Pipelines uses strings.HasPrefix to restrict paths to /tekton/ directories but fails to normalize the path with filepath.Clean first. This allows path traversal via sequences like /tekton/home/../results, which passes validation but resolves to /tekton/results at runtime, enabling access to restricted internal paths.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data< 1.11.1CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- Low
- Integrity
- Low
- Availability
- None
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify Tekton Pipelines versionRun `kubectl get tektonconfig config -o jsonpath='{.spec.pipeline.version}'` or check the installed Tekton operator version. You can also use `tkn version` if the CLI is available.Affected if The installed version is below 1.11.1 (or any of the patched versions: 1.0.2, 1.3.4, 1.6.2, 1.9.3)
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Find VolumeMount configurations in Tekton resourcesSearch for Tekton TaskRun and PipelineRun resources in your cluster: `kubectl get taskrun -o yaml` and `kubectl get pipelinerun -o yaml`. Look for `volumeMounts` entries under container specs.Affected if Any TaskRun or PipelineRun defines VolumeMounts with custom paths (not using the default Tekton workspaces)
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Inspect VolumeMount paths for traversal patternsExamine the `mountPath` values in volumeMounts sections. Look for paths containing `../` sequences such as `/tekton/home/../results` or similar path traversal constructs.Affected if A VolumeMount path contains `../` which could bypass the prefix validation but resolve to restricted paths at runtime
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Verify path resolution behaviorFor any VolumeMount with a path starting with `/tekton/` but containing `../`, manually resolve the path to see what it actually points to. For example, `/tekton/home/../results` resolves to `/tekton/results`.Affected if The resolved path points to a directory outside the intended /tekton subdirectory (e.g., /tekton/results, /tekton/home when the mount was intended to be isolated to /tekton/home)
You are affected if Tekton Pipelines version is below 1.11.1 AND your Tekton resources contain VolumeMounts with paths that include `../` sequences that could resolve to restricted internal paths.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scoped1.11.1
Upgrade to Tekton Pipelines versions 1.0.2, 1.3.4, 1.6.2, 1.9.3, or 1.11.1 which apply filepath.Clean to normalize paths before the HasPrefix validation check.
1.11.1
- Identify the current Tekton Pipelines version running in your cluster using: kubectl get tektonconfig -o jsonpath='{.items[0].spec.pipeline.version}'
- Check available Tekton Pipelines releases and confirm 1.11.1 is the latest stable fixed version
- Upgrade Tekton Pipelines to version 1.11.1 or later using your Kubernetes operator (e.g., Tekton Operator or manual kubectl apply)
- After upgrade, verify the installation: kubectl get tektonconfig
- Test that path traversal validation now properly rejects paths like /tekton/home/../results by attempting to create a VolumeMount with such paths - validation should now fail
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
- Consultation2.0 h
- Implementation4.0 h
- Testing6.0 h
- Review / QA3.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2026-40923 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-40923 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
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