CVE-2026-41005
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedCloud Foundry UAA incorrectly treated XML encryption to the Service Provider (confidentiality) as a substitute for XML signatures from the Identity Provider (authenticity) in two SAML flows: the OAuth 2.0 SAML2 bearer grant (token endpoint) and browser SSO (ACS) when wantAssertionSigned is set to false. Assertions or responses that were unsigned but contained encrypted content could still be accepted. Encryption uses the SP's public key from published metadata, therefore, any party, not only a trusted IdP, can produce ciphertext UAA can decrypt; successful decryption therefore does not prove the IdP issued the message. Affected versions: Cloud Foundry UAA (uaa_release) 2.0.0 through 78.13.0. Cloud Foundry CF Deployment all versions through 56.1.0.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceCloud Foundry UAA incorrectly treated XML encryption (confidentiality) as a substitute for XML signatures (authenticity) in SAML2 bearer grant and browser SSO flows. When wantAssertionSigned is false, UAA accepts unsigned assertions containing encrypted content, accepting any ciphertext decryptable with the SP's public key from published metadata. Since encryption key material is public, any party can produce valid-looking SAML messages that UAA will process, enabling authentication bypass.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- High
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Changed
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Check UAA versionLocate the UAA installation and determine the installed version (commonly via 'uaac version', the WAR/JAR file version, or the version reported in the UAA admin console). Compare against the affected version range for this CVE if available from vendor documentation.Affected if The installed version falls within the vulnerable version range.
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Identify SAML relying party configurationsLocate the UAA SAML configuration files (typically in uaa.yml or security.xml) or query the UAA database for SAML relying party (RP) registrations. Identify all configured SAML relying parties.Affected if SAML relying party configurations exist and are in use.
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Verify wantAssertionSigned settingExamine each SAML relying party configuration and check the value of the wantAssertionSigned attribute. This may be found in the UAA configuration YAML, the SAML metadata XML, or the relying_party_details database table.Affected if wantAssertionSigned is set to 'false' or is absent (defaulting to false) for any relying party.
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Confirm SAML SSO or bearer grant flows are enabledCheck if SAML-based browser SSO (web single sign-on) or SAML2 bearer grant authentication flows are configured and enabled in the UAA. This can be verified by reviewing the OAuth client configurations that use SAML grant types or by inspecting the SAML IdP metadata accepted by UAA.Affected if SAML2 bearer grant or browser SSO flows are enabled for any client or relying party.
A user is affected if their UAA version is vulnerable AND wantAssertionSigned is false or unset for any SAML relying party that uses SAML2 bearer grant or browser SSO flows.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scopedEnable wantAssertionSigned='true' on all SAML relying party configurations and ensure the Identity Provider signs all assertions and responses before accepting them in UAA.
uaa_release 78.14.0 (or CF Deployment 56.2.0)
- Upgrade Cloud Foundry UAA (uaa_release) from any version 2.0.0-78.13.0 to version 78.14.0 or later.
- If using CF Deployment, upgrade to version 56.2.0 or later which includes the fixed UAA version.
- After upgrading, verify that SAML authentication still functions correctly for both the OAuth 2.0 SAML2 bearer grant flow and browser SSO (ACS) flows.
- Confirm that wantAssertionSigned is set appropriately for your IdP configuration; the fix now properly requires signatures regardless of encryption.
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
- Consultation6.0 h
- Implementation8.0 h
- Testing6.0 h
- Review / QA3.0 h
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Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2026-41005 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-41005 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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