CVE-2026-41006
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedSpring HATEOAS's internal PropertyUtils.createObjectFromProperties method, used by the Collection+JSON and UBER media type deserializers, performs bean property binding via reflection without consulting Jackson access-control annotations. Affected versions: Spring HATEOAS 1.5.0 through 1.5.6; 2.3.0 through 2.3.4; 2.4.0 through 2.4.1; 2.5.0 through 2.5.2; 3.0.0 through 3.0.3.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceSpring HATEOAS's PropertyUtils.createObjectFromProperties method performs bean property binding via reflection without consulting Jackson access-control annotations (@JsonIgnore, @JsonProperty.Access.READ_ONLY). This affects Collection+JSON and UBER media type deserializers, allowing attackers to potentially set protected/read-only properties that should be excluded from deserialization, leading to information disclosure or privilege escalation.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data>= 1.5.0, < 1.5.7>= 2.3.0, < 2.3.5>= 2.4.0, < 2.4.2>= 2.5.0, < 2.5.2.1>= 3.0.0, < 3.0.3.1CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- None
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Locate Spring HATEOAS dependency in your projectSearch your Maven pom.xml, Gradle build.gradle, or inspect the classpath for spring-hateoas-*.jar files. Check the JAR manifest or META-INF/MANIFEST.MF for the version number.Affected if The installed version falls within any of these ranges: 1.5.0-1.5.6, 2.3.0-2.3.4, 2.4.0-2.4.1, 2.5.0-2.5.2, or 3.0.0-3.0.3
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Identify if Collection+JSON or UBER media type deserializers are in useSearch your codebase for references to 'application/vnd.collection+json' or 'application/vnd.uber+json' in @RequestMapping, @PostMapping, @GetMapping, or MediaType declarations. Also check HttpMessageConverter configurations.Affected if Your application deserializes requests using Collection+JSON or UBER media types with Spring HATEOAS converters enabled.
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Inspect model classes for Jackson access-control annotationsReview DTO or entity classes involved in deserialization for @JsonIgnore, @JsonIgnoreProperties, @JsonProperty(access = Access.READ_ONLY) or similar Jackson access-control annotations.Affected if Classes with protected properties using these annotations are deserialized through the affected media types, exposing data that should be hidden.
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Verify Spring HATEOAS deserializer configurationCheck for explicit registration of CollectionJsonHttpMessageConverter or UberHypermediaTypeHttpMessageConverter in your Spring configuration, or confirm they are auto-registered through classpath scanning.Affected if The vulnerable converters are registered and active in your HttpMessageConverter chain.
You are affected if you use a vulnerable Spring HATEOAS version AND deserialize Collection+JSON or UBER media type requests containing model classes with Jackson access-control annotations that should be bypassed.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scoped1.5.72.3.52.4.2
Upgrade to Spring HATEOAS 3.0.4 or later, or the appropriate patched version for each affected branch (1.5.7, 2.3.5, 2.4.2, 2.5.3). If upgrading is not immediately feasible, disable Collection+JSON and UBER media type deserializers in the application configuration.
Spring HATEOAS 1.5.7, 2.3.5, 2.4.2, 2.5.2.1, or 3.0.4 (depending on your current major version line)
- 1. Identify the current Spring HATEOAS version in your project by checking your dependency management (pom.xml, build.gradle, or equivalent).
- 2. For Spring HATEOAS 1.5.x: Upgrade to version 1.5.7 or later.
- 3. For Spring HATEOAS 2.3.x: Upgrade to version 2.3.5 or later.
- 4. For Spring HATEOAS 2.4.x: Upgrade to version 2.4.2 or later.
- 5. For Spring HATEOAS 2.5.x: Upgrade to version 2.5.2.1 or later.
- 6. For Spring HATEOAS 3.0.x: Upgrade to version 3.0.4 or later (the next patch release after 3.0.3).
- 7. Rebuild and test your application to verify the upgrade does not break existing functionality, particularly any code using Collection+JSON or UBER media type deserializers.
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
- Consultation1.0 h
- Implementation1.0 h
- Testing2.0 h
- Review / QA1.0 h
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Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2026-41006 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-41006 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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