CVE-2026-41010
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedReleaseJob#unpack builds job_dir = File.join(@release_dir, 'jobs', name) and job_tgz = File.join(@release_dir, 'jobs', "#{name}.tgz") where name returns @job_meta['name'], a value taken verbatim from the jobs: array of the attacker-supplied release.MF inside the uploaded tarball. These paths are then interpolated into a shell string: Bosh::Common::Exec.sh("tar -C #{job_dir} -xf #{job_tgz} 2>&1", :on_error => :return). Bosh::Common::Exec.sh executes via %x{#{command}} (bosh-common/lib/bosh/common/exec.rb:53), i.e. /bin/sh -c, so any shell metacharacters in name are interpreted. FileUtils.mkdir_p(job_dir) on line 49 creates the literal directory (no shell) and succeeds even when the name contains $()/;, so execution reaches the sh call. Affected versions: - BOSH Director: all versions prior to v282.1.12 (inclusive); fixed in v282.1.12 or later
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceBOSH Director's ReleaseJob#unpack method contains a command injection vulnerability where the job name from release.MF is taken verbatim and interpolated into a shell command via %x{} execution. An attacker can embed shell metacharacters like $() or ; in the job name to execute arbitrary commands with the privileges of the BOSH Director process.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Local
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- High
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Changed
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Determine BOSH Director versionRun 'bosh env' or check the BOSH Director deployment manifest/version file. On the BOSH Director VM, check /var/vcap/bosh/etc/director.yml or run 'bosh-cli director version'.Affected if The installed version is earlier than v282.1.12 (the fixed release).
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Verify BOSH Director API accessibilityConfirm whether the BOSH Director API (typically port 25555) is accessible to untrusted or non-admin users. Check firewall rules and Cloud Foundry or BOSH deployment access controls.Affected if The Director API is accessible to users who should not be permitted to upload BOSH releases.
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Inspect recent release uploadsReview BOSH Director audit logs or task logs for recent 'bosh upload-release' commands. Look for release.MF files that may contain unusual characters in job names.Affected if Suspicious or unrecognized release uploads exist in the environment, particularly from untrusted sources.
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Check for shell metacharacters in release.MFIf you have access to uploaded release tarballs, extract and inspect the release.MF file. Look at the 'jobs' array entries for characters such as $`, $(, ;, |, &, >, <, or backticks.Affected if Any release.MF file in your environment contains shell metacharacters in job name definitions.
A user is affected if their BOSH Director version is earlier than v282.1.12 AND the Director API or release upload functionality is accessible to untrusted users who could upload a malicious release.MF file.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scopedUpgrade BOSH Director to v282.1.12 or later, which includes proper input sanitization or removes shell-based execution for this code path.
BOSH Director v282.1.12 or later
- Back up the BOSH Director database and configuration before proceeding with the upgrade
- Download BOSH Director v282.1.12 or later from the Cloud Foundry release repository
- Follow the standard BOSH upgrade procedure to deploy the new Director version
- Verify the upgrade was successful by checking the Director responds and deployment operations work normally
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
- Consultation4.0 h
- Implementation4.0 h
- Testing6.0 h
- Review / QA4.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $5,024.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2026-41010 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-41010 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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