CVE-2026-41453
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedKrayin CRM before 2.2.4 contains a blind SQL injection vulnerability in the leads DataGrid that allows authenticated users with leads access to inject arbitrary SQL into a HAVING clause by manipulating the rotten_lead[in] query parameter, which is concatenated without parameterized binding directly into a havingRaw() call in LeadDataGrid.php. Attackers can exploit this flaw using time-based and boolean-based blind injection techniques to extract the entire database contents, including user credential hashes, CRM records, and application configuration data.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · moderate confidenceKrayin CRM before 2.2.4 contains a blind SQL injection in the leads DataGrid where the 'rotten_lead[in]' query parameter is concatenated directly into a havingRaw() call in LeadDataGrid.php without parameterized binding, allowing authenticated attackers to inject arbitrary SQL into the HAVING clause.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Confirm Krayin CRM installationLook for the Krayin CRM application in your web root directory, typically in a folder named 'krayin' or 'crm'. Check for the presence of composer.json or known Krayin directory structure.Affected if Krayin CRM is not present on the server - you are not affected.
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Determine installed Krayin CRM versionCheck the version file typically located at config/app.php or check the composer.json file in the Krayin root directory for the 'version' field.Affected if The version is 2.2.4 or higher - you are not affected by this CVE.
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Locate and inspect LeadDataGrid.phpFind the file LeadDataGrid.php in the packages or src directories, typically under packages/Webkul/Lead/src/DataGrids/Lead/ or similar paths. Open the file and search for 'havingRaw' calls.Affected if The file contains a havingRaw() call that uses the rotten_lead[in] parameter without parameter binding - you may be affected.
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Check for vulnerable parameter handling in havingRawIn LeadDataGrid.php, examine any havingRaw() call that includes the rotten_lead[in] parameter. Verify if the value is concatenated directly into the query string without using parameterized binding.Affected if The rotten_lead[in] parameter is concatenated directly into the havingRaw() call without escaping or parameter binding - you are affected.
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Verify lead module access permissionsLog into the Krayin CRM as a user with lead access. Navigate to the leads section. Check if you can access the leads DataGrid functionality.Affected if You do not have authenticated access to the leads module - the exploit cannot be triggered even if the vulnerability exists.
You are affected if you are running Krayin CRM version 2.2.3 or earlier, have the LeadDataGrid.php with a direct concatenation of rotten_lead[in] in havingRaw(), and have authenticated users with lead module access.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scopedUpgrade to Krayin CRM 2.2.4 or later which implements proper parameterized binding for the havingRaw() call. If immediate upgrade is not possible, implement input validation/sanitization on the rotten_lead[in] parameter.
Krayin CRM 2.2.4
- 1. Backup your entire Krayin CRM installation, including the database and all configuration files.
- 2. Review the Krayin CRM 2.2.4 release notes and changelog for any breaking changes or migration requirements.
- 3. Update your Composer dependencies to version 2.2.4 by running: composer require krayin/laravel-crm:2.2.4 or updating your composer.json
- 4. Run database migrations if required: php artisan migrate
- 5. Clear application cache: php artisan cache:clear
- 6. Verify the upgrade was successful by checking the application version and testing lead functionality.
- 7. Test that the SQL injection vulnerability is remediated by attempting the original exploit vector (rotten_lead[in] parameter)
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
- Consultation2.0 h
- Implementation3.0 h
- Testing2.0 h
- Review / QA1.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2026-41453 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-41453 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data