CVE-2026-41489
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedPi-hole is a DNS sinkhole that protects devices from unwanted content without installing any client-side software. From 6.0 to before Core 6.4.2 and FTL 6.6.1, two shell scripts executed as root by systemd (pihole-FTL-prestart.sh and pihole-FTL-poststop.sh) read the files.pid path from this config without validation and use it in privileged file operations (install and rm -f). By writing an arbitrary path into files.pid, an attacker with pihole privilege can cause root to delete and then recreate any file on the system outside the ProtectSystem=full-restricted directories, gaining write access to it. On a default Pi-hole installation this yields local privilege escalation to root via SSH authorized keys manipulation. If /root/.ssh/authorized_keys does not exist (default on fresh installs), only ExecStartPre is required. If the file exists, ExecStopPost deletes it first, and the same restart triggers both hooks in sequence. This vulnerability is fixed in Core 6.4.2 and FTL 6.6.1.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidencePi-hole versions 6.0 through Core before 6.4.2 and FTL before 6.6.1 contain a local privilege escalation vulnerability. Two systemd service scripts (pihole-FTL-prestart.sh and pihole-FTL-poststop.sh) execute as root and read the files.pid path from configuration without validation. An attacker with pihole user privileges can write an arbitrary path to the config, causing root to delete and recreate any file outside ProtectSystem=restricted directories via install and rm -f commands. This enables root escalation via SSH authorized_keys manipulation.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Local
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Changed
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify Pi-hole Core and FTL versionsRun `pihole -v` to display installed Pi-hole Core and FTL version numbersAffected if Installed versions are below Core 6.4.2 or FTL 6.6.1
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Locate the systemd service scriptsFind pihole-FTL-prestart.sh and pihole-FTL-poststop.sh using `find / -name 'pihole-FTL-prestart.sh' -o -name 'pihole-FTL-poststop.sh' 2>/dev/null`Affected if These scripts exist and are executable by the pihole user or group
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Inspect the FTL config for files.pid settingLocate the pihole FTL config file (commonly /etc/pihole/pihole-FTL.conf) and check for a files.pid= entryAffected if A files.pid setting exists and points to a path outside /run or /var/run (the default protected directories)
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Check config file ownership and permissionsRun `ls -la` on the pihole-FTL.conf file to verify it is writable by the pihole user or groupAffected if The pihole user or a group the attacker belongs to has write access to the config file
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Audit SSH authorized_keys for unauthorized entriesInspect /root/.ssh/authorized_keys for any unexpected public keysAffected if Any unfamiliar public keys are present in /root/.ssh/authorized_keys
A user is affected if they run Pi-hole Core below 6.4.2 or FTL below 6.6.1, the pihole user has write access to the config file, and the files.pid path can be manipulated to target files outside protected directories.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scopedUpgrade Pi-hole Core to 6.4.2 or later and FTL to 6.6.1 or later. If immediate patching is not possible, restrict pihole user access and monitor for unauthorized modifications to the files.pid configuration option.
Pi-hole Core 6.4.2 and FTL 6.6.1
- Check current Pi-hole Core and FTL versions using: pihole -v
- Upgrade Pi-hole Core to version 6.4.2 or later using: pihole -up
- Upgrade Pi-hole FTL to version 6.6.1 or later using: pihole -up
- Verify the upgrade was successful by checking: pihole -v
- Ensure the pihole-FTL-prestart.sh and pihole-FTL-poststop.sh scripts now properly validate the files.pid path
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
- Consultation2.0 h
- Implementation2.0 h
- Testing2.0 h
- Review / QA1.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2026-41489 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-41489 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
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