CVE-2026-41583
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedZEBRA is a Zcash node written entirely in Rust. Prior to zebrad version 4.3.1 and prior to zebra-script version 5.0.2, after a refactoring, Zebra failed to validate a consensus rule that restricted the possible values of sighash hash types for V5 transactions which were enabled in the NU5 network upgrade. Zebra nodes could thus accept and eventually mine a block that would be considered invalid by zcashd nodes, creating a consensus split between Zebra and zcashd nodes. In a similar vein, for V4 transactions, Zebra mistakenly used the "canonical" hash type when computing the sighash while zcashd (correctly per the spec) uses the raw value, which could also crate a consensus split. This issue has been patched in zebrad version 4.3.1 and zebra-script version 5.0.2.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceZebra Zcash node failed to validate consensus rules for sighash hash types in V5 transactions after a refactoring, and incorrectly used 'canonical' hash type for V4 transactions instead of the raw value per spec. This allows Zebra nodes to accept blocks that zcashd nodes would reject, creating a dangerous consensus split between implementations.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data< 5.0.2< 4.3.1CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- None
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Check zebrad binary versionRun 'zebrad --version' or 'zebrad -V' to obtain the installed zebrad version numberAffected if Version is less than 4.3.1 and the node processes V5 transactions
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Check zebra-script versionRun 'zebra-script --version' or check the installed package version via cargo or system package managerAffected if Version is less than 5.0.2 and the node processes V5 transactions
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Verify node is validating V5 transactionsInspect node logs for V5 transaction processing, or check configuration for transaction version support settingsAffected if Node actively processes V5 transactions (the consensus split only occurs when V5 transactions are validated)
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Compare against affected version rangesCompare the installed zebrad version to '< 4.3.1' and zebra-script version to '< 5.0.2' using the version numbers obtained aboveAffected if Either zebrad is below 4.3.1 OR zebra-script is below 5.0.2 while processing V5 transactions
You are affected if your zebrad version is below 4.3.1 or zebra-script version is below 5.0.2 AND your node is actively validating V5 transactions, as this creates a consensus split with zcashd nodes.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scoped4.3.15.0.2
Upgrade zebrad to version 4.3.1 or later and zebra-script to version 5.0.2 or later to patch the consensus validation issues.
zebrad >= 4.3.1 and zebra-script >= 5.0.2
- 1. Identify the currently installed zebra version by running 'zebrad --version' and 'zebra-script --version' (or checking your package manager)
- 2. For zebrad: Upgrade to version 4.3.1 or later by following your installation method (cargo, release binary, or package manager)
- 3. For zebra-script: Upgrade to version 5.0.2 or later using the same installation method used for zebrad
- 4. After upgrading, verify the new versions are correctly installed by checking 'zebrad --version' and 'zebra-script --version'
- 5. Review the zebra release notes for version 4.3.1 and zebra-script 5.0.2 to understand any configuration or operational changes required
- 6. Restart the zebra node services to load the updated binaries
- 7. Monitor the node after restart to ensure it syncs correctly and validates transactions with the proper sighash rules
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
- Consultation2.0 h
- Implementation3.0 h
- Testing6.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2026-41583 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-41583 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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