CVE-2026-41669
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedAdmidio is an open-source user management solution. Prior to version 5.0.9, the Admidio SAML Identity Provider implementation discards the return value of its validateSignature() method at both call sites (handleSSORequest() line 418 and handleSLORequest() line 613). The method returns error strings on failure rather than throwing exceptions, but the developer believed it would throw (per comments on lines 416 and 611). This means the smc_require_auth_signed configuration option is completely ineffective — unsigned or invalidly-signed SAML AuthnRequests and LogoutRequests are processed identically to properly signed ones. This issue has been patched in version 5.0.9.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceIn Admidio prior to 5.0.9, the SAML Identity Provider's validateSignature() method returns error strings on failure rather than throwing exceptions, but the developers incorrectly assumed it would throw and discarded the return values at both call sites in handleSSORequest() and handleSLORequest(). This makes the smc_require_auth_signed configuration option ineffective, allowing unsigned or invalidly-signed SAML AuthnRequests and LogoutRequests to be processed as valid.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- Low
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- None
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify Admidio installation and versionLocate the Admidio installation directory and check the version. Common locations include a version.php file, a config.php file, or a README file in the root installation directory. Look for a version constant or variable set to a numeric version like 5.0.x.Affected if The installed version is prior to 5.0.9 (for example, 5.0.8, 5.0.7, 4.x, or earlier).
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Confirm SAML module is enabledCheck for SAML-related configuration in the Admidio configuration files. Look for settings related to SAML, Single Sign-On (SSO), or Identity Provider (IdP) configuration. Common config files may be named config.php, settings.php, or stored in a config directory.Affected if SAML authentication or Single Sign-On is configured and enabled in the Admidio installation.
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Verify smc_require_auth_signed configurationSearch the configuration files for the setting named 'smc_require_auth_signed' or similar variations like 'require_auth_signed', 'saml_require_signed', or 'requireSignedRequests'. This setting controls whether SAML requests must be signed.Affected if The smc_require_auth_signed configuration option is set to a value that requires signed requests (such as true, 1, or 'yes').
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Locate SAML handler codeFind the SAML handler PHP files in the Admidio installation. Look for files containing handleSSORequest() and handleSLORequest() methods. These are typically in a 'saml', 'login', or 'authentication' directory within the Admidio codebase.Affected if The SAML handler code exists and handles SSO or SLO requests.
The environment is affected if Admidio version is prior to 5.0.9 AND SAML authentication is configured, regardless of the smc_require_auth_signed setting value because the signature validation return values are being discarded.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scopedUpgrade Admidio to version 5.0.9 or later to obtain the patch that properly handles validateSignature() return values.
5.0.9
- Verify current Admidio version by checking the administration panel or the version.php file in the installation directory
- Backup the entire Admidio installation directory and database before upgrading
- Download Admidio version 5.0.9 from the official GitHub releases page (github.com/admidio/admidio)
- Extract the new version files and replace the existing installation files, preserving the config.php and any custom uploads folder
- Verify the integrity of the SAML configuration, particularly the smc_require_auth_signed setting
- Test SAML login (SP-initiated SSO) and logout (SLO) flows to confirm signature validation is now enforced
- Review the application logs for any signature validation errors during testing
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
- Consultation2.0 h
- Implementation2.0 h
- Testing4.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $2,752.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2026-41669 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-41669 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
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