CVE-2026-41670
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedAdmidio is an open-source user management solution. Prior to version 5.0.9, the SAML IdP implementation in Admidio's SSO module uses the AssertionConsumerServiceURL value directly from incoming SAML AuthnRequest messages as the destination for the SAML response, without validating it against the registered ACS URL (smc_acs_url) stored in the database for the corresponding service provider client. An attacker who knows the Entity ID of a registered SP client can craft a SAML AuthnRequest with an arbitrary AssertionConsumerServiceURL, causing the IdP to send the signed SAML response -- containing user identity attributes (login name, email, roles, profile fields) -- to an attacker-controlled URL. This issue has been patched in version 5.0.9.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceAdmidio's SAML IdP implementation accepts and uses the AssertionConsumerServiceURL directly from incoming SAML AuthnRequest messages without validating it against the registered smc_acs_url stored in the database. This allows an attacker to redirect signed SAML responses containing sensitive user identity attributes (login name, email, roles, profile fields) to an arbitrary attacker-controlled URL.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- Required
- Scope
- Changed
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- Low
- Availability
- None
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify Admidio installation versionLocate the version file in your Admidio installation (commonly version.php or similar in the root directory) and read the declared version number.Affected if The installed version is lower than 5.0.9.
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Verify SAML IdP is configuredQuery your Admidio database for records in the table containing smc_acs_url configuration (typically the organization-specific or plugin settings table). Look for entries where smc_acs_url is populated.Affected if SAML IdP is configured with an smc_acs_url value present in the database.
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Confirm SAML functionality is activeCheck if the SAML IdP module is enabled in Admidio settings or configuration. This may be in the plugin configuration, organization settings, or a dedicated SAML settings page.Affected if SAML IdP functionality is enabled and operational.
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Check for the vulnerability conditionReview the installed Admidio version against the fixed version 5.0.9. If the version is below 5.0.9 AND SAML IdP is configured with smc_acs_url, the environment is potentially affected.Affected if Admidio version is below 5.0.9 AND SAML IdP is configured with an smc_acs_url value.
A user is affected if running Admidio version below 5.0.9 with SAML IdP functionality enabled and configured with an smc_acs_url in the database.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scopedUpgrade to Admidio version 5.0.9 which implements proper validation of the AssertionConsumerServiceURL against registered service provider configurations before sending SAML responses.
5.0.9
- 1. Back up the existing Admidio installation directory and database before proceeding with the upgrade.
- 2. Download Admidio version 5.0.9 from the official repository or distribution channel.
- 3. Replace the existing Admidio files with the new version 5.0.9 files, preserving any custom configuration files if needed.
- 4. Run any database migration scripts if included in the upgrade package.
- 5. Verify the SAML IdP functionality by testing that the AssertionConsumerServiceURL is now properly validated against the registered smc_acs_url in the database.
- 6. Confirm that user authentication via SAML SSO continues to work correctly for legitimate service provider clients.
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
- Consultation3.0 h
- Implementation4.0 h
- Testing4.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $3,648.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2026-41670 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-41670 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
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