CVE-2026-41704
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedAgentClient#handle_method (lines 264-303) processes every NATS reply. It calls inject_compile_log (line 273) on every response, which reads response['value']['result']['compile_log_id'] (line 332-338) and passes it to download_and_delete_blob. Separately, any response containing 'exception' goes through format_exception (lines 308-325), which reads exception['blobstore_id'] and also calls download_and_delete_blob. That helper (lines 344-349) calls ResourceManager#get_resource(blob_id) and, in an ensure block, ResourceManager#delete_resource(blob_id). ResourceManager (resource_manager.rb:62-70) calls blobstore.delete(id) on the single shared Director blobstore with no UUID-format check, no ownership check, and no namespace prefix. Affected versions: BOSH Director: All versions prior to v282.1.12
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceBOSH Director's AgentClient processes NATS replies and calls download_and_delete_blob on compile_log_id and exception blobstore_id values without validation. The ResourceManager deletes blobs from the shared Director blobstore without checking UUID format, ownership, or namespace prefixes, allowing arbitrary blob deletion via crafted responses.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data< 282.1.12CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Local
- Complexity
- High
- Privileges
- High
- User interaction
- Required
- Scope
- Changed
- Confidentiality
- None
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- None
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:R/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:N
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
-
Confirm BOSH Director is deployedRun 'bosh env' or check for bosh-director pods/services in your infrastructure to verify a BOSH Director instance exists in your environmentAffected if No BOSH Director is found, this CVE does not apply
-
Identify installed BOSH versionRun 'bosh --version' or query the BOSH Director API: 'curl -k https://<director-ip>:25555/info' to retrieve the version fieldAffected if Version is 282.1.12 or higher, the vulnerability is patched; versions below 282.1.12 are affected
-
Verify NATS messaging is enabledCheck BOSH Director configuration for 'nats' section in the deployment manifest or runtime config, typically found at /var/vcap/jobs/bosh-director/config/manifest.ymlAffected if NATS is disabled, the attack vector may not be reachable; however, the vulnerability still exists in the code
-
Confirm blobstore is in useCheck Director manifest for 'blobstore' provider configuration (e.g., local, s3, azure) under the director section, typically at /var/vcap/jobs/bosh-director/config/manifest.ymlAffected if No blobstore configured, the specific delete vector may not apply but the code flaw persists
You are affected if you have a BOSH Director instance running version lower than 282.1.12 with NATS and blobstore enabled, as the unauthenticated arbitrary blob deletion can be triggered through crafted NATS replies.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scoped282.1.12
Implement UUID format validation, ownership verification, and namespace prefix checks in ResourceManager#delete_resource before calling blobstore.delete to prevent unauthorized blob deletion.
BOSH Director v282.1.12 or later
- Ensure you have a current backup of your BOSH Director state and deployments
- Verify your current BOSH Director version is below v282.1.12 using 'bosh env' or bosh-cli
- Upload the new stemcell if required by checking release notes for v282.1.12
- Deploy the new BOSH Director v282.1.12 using your existing deployment manifest with 'bosh deploy'
- Verify the upgrade completed successfully by checking 'bosh env' shows v282.1.12 or later
- Validate that the blobstore operations now properly validate UUID format and ownership before deletion
- Test that your existing deployments continue to function correctly post-upgrade
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
- Consultation6.0 h
- Implementation12.0 h
- Testing6.0 h
- Review / QA4.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $7,968.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2026-41704 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-41704 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
Be the first to add a field note for this CVE — a mitigation you’ve verified, a version caveat, or a link to a working fix. Sign in above to contribute.
A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.
- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data