CVE-2026-42259
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedSaltcorn is an extensible, open source, no-code database application builder. Prior to versions 1.4.6, 1.5.6, and 1.6.0-beta.5, Saltcorn validates the post-login dest parameter with a string check that only blocks :/ and //. Because all WHATWG-compliant browsers normalise backslashes (\) to forward slashes (/) for special schemes, a payload such as /\evil.com/path slips through is_relative_url(), is emitted unchanged in the HTTP Location header, and causes the browser to navigate cross-origin to an attacker-controlled domain. The bug is reachable on a default install and only requires a victim who can be tricked into logging in via a crafted Saltcorn URL. This issue has been patched in versions 1.4.6, 1.5.6, and 1.6.0-beta.5.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceSaltcorn validates the post-login destination parameter with inadequate checks that only block `:/` and `//` strings. Attackers exploit browser backslash normalization (browsers convert \ to / for special schemes) to bypass validation using payloads like /\evil.com/path, causing an open redirect via the HTTP Location header to an attacker-controlled domain.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- Authentication
- X
- User interaction
- A
- Scope
- X
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
-
Identify installed Saltcorn versionRun `saltcorn --version` or check the package.json file in the Saltcorn installation directory for the version fieldAffected if The installed version is earlier than 1.4.6, 1.5.6, or 1.6.0-beta.5 (the fixed versions)
-
Locate the post-login redirect handler codeSearch the codebase for code handling the login destination or redirect URL parameter, typically in authentication-related files or routes handling `/auth/login` or similar endpointsAffected if The validation logic only checks for `:/` or `//` strings and does not account for backslash normalization or validate against a allowlist of permitted domains/paths
-
Inspect URL validation logicExamine the code that validates the redirect URL parameter passed after authentication. Look for string matching patterns that block dangerous redirectsAffected if The validation does not normalize backslashes to forward slashes, does not validate the final resolved URL scheme, or does not enforce that the redirect target is a relative path or trusted domain
-
Test for open redirect via backslash bypassIf you have access to a test environment, attempt to log in with a crafted `next` or `destination` parameter containing a backslash-based payload such as `/\evil.com/path` and observe the HTTP Location header in the responseAffected if The application responds with a Location header pointing to an external untrusted domain, indicating the bypass was successful
A user is affected if they run a Saltcorn version earlier than the fixed releases AND the application uses the vulnerable redirect parameter validation that fails to block backslash-based payloads like /\evil.com/path.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scopedUpgrade to Saltcorn versions 1.4.6, 1.5.6, or 1.6.0-beta.5, which contain proper URL validation that accounts for backslash normalization.
1.4.6, 1.5.6, or 1.6.0-beta.5 (depending on your current major version branch)
- 1. Identify the currently running Saltcorn version by checking package.json, package-lock.json, or application startup logs
- 2. If running version <1.4.6, upgrade to version 1.4.6
- 3. If running version 1.4.x where x>=0 but <1.5.6, upgrade to version 1.5.6
- 4. If running version 1.5.x where x>=0 but <1.6.0-beta.5, upgrade to version 1.6.0-beta.5 or later stable release
- 5. For npm/yarn installations: run 'npm install saltcorn@<fixed_version>' or 'yarn add saltcorn@<fixed_version>'
- 6. For Docker deployments: pull the corresponding Docker image tag (e.g., 'docker pull saltcorn/saltcorn:1.4.6')
- 7. Restart the Saltcorn service after upgrading
- 8. Verify the fix by testing login flow with a malicious dest parameter containing backslash-based payloads like '/\evil.com/path'
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
- Consultation2.0 h
- Implementation4.0 h
- Testing3.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $3,088.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2026-42259 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-42259 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
Be the first to add a field note for this CVE — a mitigation you’ve verified, a version caveat, or a link to a working fix. Sign in above to contribute.
A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.
- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data