CVE-2026-42369
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedGV-VMS V20 is a Video Monitoring Software used to gather the feeds of many surveillance cameras and manage other security devices. It is a native application accessed locally, but it is also possible to enable remote access via the "WebCam Server" feature. Once enabled, it is possible to access to the management and monitoring feature via a regular Web interface. This webersever is another native application, compiled without ASLR, which makes exploitation much easier and more likely. Most of the features require authentication before being reachable and leverage a standard login page to grant access. However the `gvapi` endpoint uses its own authentication mechanism via an `HTTP Authorization` header. It supports both `Basic` authentication and the `Digest` modes of authentication. #### Stack-overflow via unbound copy of base64 decoded string The `b64decoder` string is sized dynamically, but it is then copied to the `Buffer` stack variable one character at the time at [0], and there's no bound-check. As such, if the decoded string is bigger than 256 characters (the size of the `Buffer` variable) then a stack overflow occurs. Because the data can be fully controlled by an attacker and lack of ASLR, this vulnerability can easily be exploited to gain full code execution as SYSTEM on the machine running the service.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceStack-based buffer overflow in GV-VMS V20 WebCam Server's gvapi endpoint. The base64-decoded authorization string is copied to a fixed 256-byte stack buffer without bounds checking, allowing overflow when decoded string exceeds 256 characters. The service runs as SYSTEM and the binary lacks ASLR, enabling trivial remote code execution.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Changed
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Verify GV-VMS V20 installation and versionLocate the GV-VMS installation directory (commonly C:\Program Files\GeoVision\GV-VMS or C:\GeoVision\GV-VMS). Check for the main executable (GV-VMS.exe or VMSWebServer.exe) and right-click to view Properties > Details for the File Version.Affected if GV-VMS V20.x is installed and the version falls within the affected range (any V20 version prior to patch).
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Confirm WebCam Server service is runningOpen Services (services.msc) and look for a service named 'GV VMS WebCam Server' or 'WebCam Server'. Check the Status column; if it shows 'Running', the vulnerable component is active.Affected if The WebCam Server service is running and listening on network ports (default 8088, 8089, or 80).
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Identify the gvapi endpoint exposureOpen Command Prompt and run 'netstat -ano | findstr LISTENING' to list listening ports. Look for ports associated with the WebCam Server (often 8088, 8089). Use a browser or curl to access http://localhost:PORT/gvapi and verify the endpoint responds.Affected if The gvapi endpoint is accessible over the network (not localhost-only) and accepts authorization headers.
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Check service account privilegesIn Services, right-click the WebCam Server service > Properties > Log On tab. Verify the account listed is not 'Local System account' or 'SYSTEM'.Affected if The service runs under Local System account or SYSTEM, meaning it has highest privileges.
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Verify binary ASLR protectionNavigate to the WebCam Server binary location (e.g., in the GV-VMS installation folder). Use dumpbin /headers or a tool like PE Explorer to check the DLL Characteristics field. Look for 'DYNAMIC_BASE' flag indicating ASLR is enabled.Affected if The binary lacks ASLR (DYNAMIC_BASE flag not set), making exploitation reliable.
If GV-VMS V20 is installed with WebCam Server running as SYSTEM and the gvapi endpoint is network-accessible, the system is vulnerable to this buffer overflow.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataDisable the WebCam Server feature if not required; apply vendor patch when available; if WebCam Server is required, isolate the service via network segmentation and restrict access to trusted IPs only.
- Consultation4.0 h
- Implementation3.0 h
- Testing3.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
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Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2026-42369 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-42369 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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