dbcve.org
Missing AuthenticationWeakness · CWE-306

CVE-2026-42864

CRITICAL · 9.9 CVSS v3.1 Published 2026-05-11
Mitigation only
No fix yet — a mitigation exists. There is no fixed release. A documented workaround reduces exposure in the meantime.
See remediation →
100/100
Remediation priority · Urgent
Remotely reachable No privileges Zero-click

Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.

NVD · unedited
FireFighter is an incident management application. Prior to 0.0.54, the POST /api/v2/firefighter/raid/jira_bot endpoint (CreateJiraBotView) is reachable without authentication (permission_classes = [permissions.AllowAny]). Its attachments payload is fetched server-side via httpx.get() with no URL validation, then uploaded as an attachment on the Jira ticket that gets created. An unauthenticated caller able to reach the ingress can coerce the pod into fetching arbitrary URLs and exfiltrate the response as a Jira attachment. On EC2/EKS deployments that do not enforce IMDSv2, this allows theft of the temporary AWS credentials attached to the pod's IAM role. The docstring on the view claims a Bearer token is required, but the code does not enforce it. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.0.54.

Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.

dbcve analysis · high confidence

This is a critical SSRF (Server-Side Request Forgery) vulnerability with authentication bypass in FireFighter. The POST /api/v2/firefighter/raid/jira_bot endpoint is accessible without authentication (permission_classes = [permissions.AllowAny]) despite documentation claiming a Bearer token is required. The endpoint fetches attachment URLs server-side via httpx.get() without any URL validation, allowing attackers to coerce the server into fetching arbitrary URLs and exfiltrating responses as Jira attachments. On EC2/EKS deployments without IMDSv2, this enables theft of temporary AWS IAM role credentials.

MitigationUpgrade to version 0.0.54 or later which fixes the authentication enforcement and adds URL validation. For immediate mitigation, implement network-level controls to restrict outbound access from the application and enable IMDSv2 on cloud deployments.

Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.

CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.

From the vector
Attack vector
Network
Complexity
Low
Privileges
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Changed
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
Low
Availability
Low

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:L

Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.

dbcve checks

Work through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.

  1. Identify FireFighter installation and version
    Locate the FireFighter application in your environment. Check the installed version by examining the package.json, requirements.txt, setup.py, or the running container image tag. Compare against the fixed version 0.0.54.
    Affected if The installed version is lower than 0.0.54.
  2. Verify the jira_bot endpoint exists
    Check if the endpoint POST /api/v2/firefighter/raid/jira_bot is present in your deployed application by examining the Django/DRF route configuration or by making a test request to the endpoint.
    Affected if The endpoint is present in the application.
  3. Inspect authentication configuration on the endpoint
    Examine the source code for the jira_bot view to verify the permission_classes setting. Look for 'permission_classes = [permissions.AllowAny]' or confirm it uses authentication.
    Affected if permission_classes is set to AllowAny or no authentication is enforced.
  4. Check for URL validation in httpx.get() call
    Review the jira_bot endpoint handler code to determine if any URL validation or whitelist is performed before the httpx.get() call that fetches attachment URLs.
    Affected if No URL validation is performed before the HTTP request.
  5. Assess network exposure and cloud metadata access
    Determine if the application has unrestricted outbound network access and if it is deployed on EC2/EKS. Check if IMDSv2 is enabled on cloud instances.
    Affected if The application can make arbitrary outbound requests AND is deployed on EC2/EKS without IMDSv2 protection.

You are affected if FireFighter version is below 0.0.54 AND the jira_bot endpoint is exposed with AllowAny permissions lacking URL validation, particularly if deployed on EC2/EKS with outbound access and no IMDSv2.

Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.

Check your environment

Paste your version and any relevant configuration and it will be compared against the affected criteria above. Do not include secrets or credentials.

AI-assisted, checked against the advisory. Informational, not a guarantee.

Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.

dbcve · scoped
Mitigation available No clean upgrade yet — mitigate in the meantime
Mitigation

Upgrade to version 0.0.54 or later which fixes the authentication enforcement and adds URL validation. For immediate mitigation, implement network-level controls to restrict outbound access from the application and enable IMDSv2 on cloud deployments.

Recommended fix High confidence

Upgrade to FireFighter version 0.0.54 or later

  1. Identify the currently deployed version of FireFighter by checking the container image tag or deployment configuration
  2. Confirm the deployed version is prior to 0.0.54 (vulnerable)
  3. Pull the fixed release version 0.0.54 or later from the container registry
  4. Update the deployment manifest or Helm chart to reference the new version
  5. Test the upgrade in a staging environment to verify the /api/v2/firefighter/raid/jira_bot endpoint now requires authentication
  6. Deploy the updated version to production
  7. Verify that the permission_classes on CreateJiraBotView now enforce authentication (e.g., IsAuthenticated or Bearer token)
  8. If using EKS/EC2, verify IMDSv2 is enforced on the nodes to further limit credential exfiltration risk
Caveat Review release notes between your current version and 0.0.54 for any breaking changes to API contracts or functionality

Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.

Have this fixed Scoped from the published advisory
  • Consultation2.0 h
  • Implementation3.0 h
  • Testing2.0 h
  • Review / QA1.0 h
8.0 hours of engineering $1,420
Get help mitigating

An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $2,272.

Scan for this in your stack

Free · runs locally
dbcve dependency scanner

Check whether your project pulls in CVE-2026-42864 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.

Get it on GitHub Scan in the browser

References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.

Primary sources

Practitioner notes

Contributed

Peer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-42864 in production — separate from our analysis above.

No notes yet

Be the first to add a field note for this CVE — a mitigation you’ve verified, a version caveat, or a link to a working fix. Sign in above to contribute.

What this is

A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.

What belongs here
  • Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
  • Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
  • No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
  • No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data