CVE-2026-42869
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedSOCFortress CoPilot focuses on providing a single pane of glass for all your security operations needs. Prior to 0.1.57, SOCFortress CoPilot ships a hardcoded JWT signing secret as a fallback value in backend/app/auth/utils.py:28 and ships it verbatim in .env.example. Any deployment where JWT_SECRET is not explicitly set — including the default Docker Compose setup — signs all authentication tokens with this publicly known value. An unauthenticated attacker can forge arbitrary admin-scoped JWTs and gain full control of the application and every security tool it manages without any credentials. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.1.57.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceSOCFortress CoPilot versions prior to 0.1.57 contain a hardcoded JWT signing secret in backend/app/auth/utils.py that is also shipped in .env.example. Deployments where JWT_SECRET is not explicitly set—including default Docker Compose—use this publicly known secret to sign all authentication tokens, allowing unauthenticated attackers to forge arbitrary admin-scoped JWTs and gain full application control.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Changed
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify CoPilot versionLocate the version file or Docker image tag used in your deployment. Common locations include a version.txt file, package.json, docker-compose.yml version labels, or the CoPilot web UI footer.Affected if The installed version is lower than 0.1.57.
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Locate JWT_SECRET configurationCheck your environment configuration files (.env, .env.production) and running container environment variables for the JWT_SECRET setting. Run 'echo $JWT_SECRET' on running containers or inspect your deployment's environment file.Affected if JWT_SECRET is not defined, empty, or set to the default value from .env.example.
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Inspect auth/utils.py for hardcoded secretExamine the file backend/app/auth/utils.py in your deployment, specifically around line 28. Look for any hardcoded string assigned to JWT_SECRET or used as a signing key.Affected if A hardcoded secret value is present in the source code at line 28.
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Verify Docker Compose default configurationIf using Docker Compose, review your docker-compose.yml and any accompanying .env file. Determine whether JWT_SECRET was explicitly configured or if the deployment relies on defaults.Affected if The deployment uses default Docker Compose settings without a custom JWT_SECRET defined in the .env file.
You are affected if your CoPilot version is below 0.1.57 AND JWT_SECRET was not explicitly set in your environment, allowing the publicly known hardcoded secret to be used for token signing.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scopedUpgrade to version 0.1.57 or later and explicitly set a unique JWT_SECRET environment variable in all production deployments; also rotate any potentially compromised secrets and invalidate existing sessions.
Upgrade to version 0.1.57 or later
- Upgrade SOCFortress CoPilot to version 0.1.57 or later
- After upgrade, ensure JWT_SECRET environment variable is explicitly set to a strong, unique value in your deployment configuration
- Verify the application is using the new JWT_SECRET by generating a test token and confirming it cannot be forged with the old hardcoded secret
- If using Docker Compose, update your docker-compose.yml to include a JWT_SECRET variable with a secure random value
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
- Consultation2.0 h
- Implementation2.0 h
- Testing2.0 h
- Review / QA1.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2026-42869 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-42869 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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