CVE-2026-42947
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedA flaw in Naxclow's platform’s onboarding workflow allows an attacker to replay a confirm-then-bind sequence to silently reassign a device to an arbitrary account. Because the affected endpoints validate request signatures but do not confirm legitimate ownership, an attacker with any account can take over a device without user interaction while the device remains online and unaware.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · moderate confidenceNaxclow's platform onboarding workflow contains a replay vulnerability in its confirm-then-bind sequence. The affected endpoints validate cryptographic signatures but fail to verify legitimate device ownership or implement replay protection, allowing any authenticated attacker to capture and replay a valid onboarding request to reassign a target device to their own account without the legitimate user's knowledge or interaction.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify onboarding and device binding endpointsReview your API documentation or network traffic logs for endpoints related to device onboarding, device binding, or device registration. Look for patterns like /bind, /onboard, /register-device, /confirm-device.Affected if Your environment exposes endpoints that handle device binding or onboarding without visible ownership verification mechanisms.
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Verify ownership confirmation in bind flowExamine the request flow for device binding operations. Check if the bind confirmation step requires the legitimate user's active authorization, such as a challenge-response, out-of-band code, or explicit user consent action.Affected if The bind flow completes with only signature validation and no step requiring the original owner or device to actively confirm the ownership change.
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Check for replay attack protectionsInspect the bind confirmation request parameters for unique, non-reusable elements such as timestamps, nonces, session tokens, or one-time codes that would prevent replaying a previously captured confirm-then-bind sequence.Affected if The confirmation request can be captured and replayed verbatim to complete a device hijacking without any time-bound or unique-per-session validation.
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Audit device reassignment logsReview authentication and device management logs for occurrences where a device was bound or reassigned to a different account. Look for bind events where the requesting user differs from the device's original owner.Affected if Devices can be reassigned to arbitrary accounts without the original owner initiating or confirming the change.
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Test ownership persistenceIf you have a test device, attempt to initiate a bind from a secondary account while the device remains online and actively connected with the legitimate account. Observe whether the bind succeeds without prompting the legitimate owner.Affected if A device already registered to one account can be bound to a different account without requiring confirmation from the original owning account or the device itself.
You are affected if your Naxclow platform deployment allows devices to be bound or reassigned to arbitrary accounts through a replayable confirm-then-bind sequence that validates signatures but does not require active authorization from the legitimate owner.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataImplement ownership verification requiring the device to prove legitimate绑定 (e.g., device-specific secrets or out-of-band confirmation), add replay protection using nonces/timestamps with server-side validation, and consider requiring explicit user consent for device binding.
- Consultation8.0 h
- Implementation24.0 h
- Testing12.0 h
- Review / QA8.0 h
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Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2026-42947 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-42947 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
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- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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