CVE-2026-43940
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedelecterm is an open-sourced terminal/ssh/sftp/telnet/serialport/RDP/VNC/Spice/ftp client. Prior to version 3.7.16, the runWidget function in src/app/widgets/load-widget.js constructs a file path by directly concatenating user‑supplied widget identifiers without any sanitisation. Because runWidget is exposed to the renderer process via an asynchronous IPC handler with no input validation, an attacker who achieves JavaScript execution inside the renderer (for example, through a malicious plugin or a cross‑site scripting flaw in the built‑in webview) can abuse a path traversal (../) to load and execute an arbitrary JavaScript file anywhere on the victim’s filesystem. This gives the attacker local code execution with the full privileges of the electerm process, leading to complete system compromise. This issue has been patched in version 3.7.16.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceA path traversal vulnerability in electerm's runWidget function allows arbitrary JavaScript file execution via the IPC handler. The function directly concatenates user-supplied widget identifiers to construct file paths without sanitization, enabling an attacker with renderer process access (via malicious plugin or XSS) to load and execute arbitrary JS files anywhere on the filesystem.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data< 3.7.16CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Local
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
-
Identify electerm versionRun 'electerm --version' or check the package.json in the electerm installation directory for the version fieldAffected if Version is less than 3.7.16 (e.g., 3.7.15, 3.7.14, etc.)
-
Locate the runWidget IPC handlerSearch the electerm source code for 'runWidget' function and its associated IPC handler registration, typically in the main process codeAffected if The runWidget function exists and concatenates widget identifiers to file paths without sanitization (check for direct path construction like 'path.join(baseDir, widgetId)')
-
Verify widget identifier handlingExamine the runWidget function code to confirm it accepts widget identifiers as input and uses them directly in file path construction without validationAffected if The function accepts widget identifiers from IPC input and uses them in file path construction without rejecting '../' sequences
-
Confirm plugin or renderer access exposureCheck if the electerm plugin system is enabled or if XSS vulnerabilities exist in the web content served to the renderer processAffected if Attacker can inject code into the renderer process (via plugins or XSS) to invoke the runWidget IPC handler with malicious widget identifiers
-
Test for path traversal in widget loadingIf you have access to the IPC mechanism, invoke the runWidget handler with a widget identifier containing '../' sequences (e.g., '../../../etc/passwd')Affected if The application accepts and processes widget identifiers containing path traversal sequences, allowing access to files outside the intended widget directory
You are affected if electerm version is below 3.7.16 AND the runWidget IPC handler is accessible/active in your environment, allowing an attacker with renderer process access to exploit the path traversal for arbitrary JS file execution.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scoped3.7.16
Upgrade to electerm version 3.7.16 or later, which includes input validation for widget identifiers. If upgrading is not immediately feasible, implement sanitization to reject path traversal sequences (../) in widget identifiers at the IPC handler layer.
electerm version 3.7.16
- Backup your electerm configuration and any important data
- Download electerm version 3.7.16 or later from the official GitHub releases (github.com/electerm/electerm/releases)
- Install the new version, replacing your current installation
- Verify the upgrade was successful by checking electerm's version information
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
- Consultation3.0 h
- Implementation2.0 h
- Testing3.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $2,832.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2026-43940 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-43940 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
Be the first to add a field note for this CVE — a mitigation you’ve verified, a version caveat, or a link to a working fix. Sign in above to contribute.
A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.
- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data