CVE-2026-43992
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedJunoClaw is an agentic AI platform built on Juno Network. Prior to 0.x.y-security-1, every MCP write tool (send_tokens, execute_contract, instantiate_contract, upload_wasm, ibc_transfer, etc.) accepted 'mnemonic: string' as an explicit tool-call parameter. The BIP-39 seed was consequently embedded in the LLM tool-call JSON, exposing it to any transport, log, or telemetry surface in the path between the LLM provider and the MCP process. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.x.y-security-1.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceThe MCP write tools in JunoClaw (send_tokens, execute_contract, instantiate_contract, upload_wasm, ibc_transfer) accepted 'mnemonic: string' as an explicit parameter, causing BIP-39 seed phrases to be embedded in LLM tool-call JSON and exposed to any transport, log, or telemetry surface between the LLM provider and MCP process.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify JunoClaw installation and versionLocate the JunoClaw application or package in your environment. Check its version using 'junoclaw --version', 'pip show junoclaw', or the package manager used for deployment. Compare against the fixed version 0.x.y-security-1.Affected if The installed version is prior to the security-patched release and the MCP write tools have been invoked.
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Review MCP tool configuration filesInspect the configuration files or code that define the MCP tool schemas for JunoClaw. Look for tool definitions of send_tokens, execute_contract, instantiate_contract, upload_wasm, and ibc_transfer. Check if these tools include 'mnemonic' as a declared parameter.Affected if The MCP tool schemas contain 'mnemonic: string' as an explicit parameter for any of the five write tools.
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Examine LLM tool-call logs or tracesSearch logs, API traces, or telemetry records that capture LLM tool invocation JSON. Look for any instances where the 'arguments' or 'parameters' field contains a BIP-39 seed phrase (typically 12 or 24 words) under a 'mnemonic' key within calls to the affected JunoClaw tools.Affected if Log files, transport streams, or telemetry systems contain mnemonic phrases in tool-call data for send_tokens, execute_contract, instantiate_contract, upload_wasm, or ibc_transfer.
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Audit historical tool usageReview access logs, audit trails, or monitoring dashboards that record MCP tool executions. Identify whether any of the five write tools were called with mnemonic values provided as arguments.Affected if Historical records show executions of send_tokens, execute_contract, instantiate_contract, upload_wasm, or ibc_transfer where a mnemonic was passed.
You are affected if JunoClaw version is prior to the security patch AND the MCP write tools (send_tokens, execute_contract, instantiate_contract, upload_wasm, ibc_transfer) were used with an explicit mnemonic parameter, or if mnemonic phrases appear in your logs or telemetry.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scopedUpgrade to version 0.x.y-security-1 and rotate any mnemonic phrases that may have been exposed through logs, telemetry, or network traces.
0.x.y-security-1
- 1. Review the codebase to identify all MCP write tool implementations that currently accept 'mnemonic: string' as a parameter (send_tokens, execute_contract, instantiate_contract, upload_wasm, ibc_transfer, etc.)
- 2. Modify these tools to retrieve the mnemonic from a secure, non-exposed source instead of direct tool-call parameters
- 3. Implement a secure configuration or secret management solution (e.g., environment variables, secure vault) to store the BIP-39 seed
- 4. Update the MCP tool schemas to remove the 'mnemonic' parameter from all write operations
- 5. Ensure the mnemonic is never logged, transmitted, or exposed in any telemetry or transport layer
- 6. Review the fix at the vendor commit: https://github.com/Dragonmonk111/junoclaw/commit/339701e
- 7. Test all MCP write tools to confirm they function correctly without the mnemonic parameter
- 8. Verify no mnemonic strings appear in logs, traces, or network traffic
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
- Consultation4.0 h
- Implementation16.0 h
- Testing8.0 h
- Review / QA4.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2026-43992 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-43992 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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