CVE-2026-44712
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedpam_usb provides hardware authentication for Linux using ordinary removable media. Prior to 0.8.7, a crafted UUID such as $(id>/tmp/rce) in the config causes root RCE when pamusb-conf --reset-pads is run. A USB device with a crafted filesystem UUID (some controllers allow this) can inject the payload at --add-device time. Also, userName from the XML config is passed to os.system() in pamusb-agent, which invokes a shell. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.8.7.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidencepam_usb versions prior to 0.8.7 contain multiple command injection vulnerabilities allowing root RCE. The UUID field in configuration accepts unsanitized input that gets executed via shell when pamusb-conf --reset-pads runs, and userName from XML config is passed to os.system() without sanitization in pamusb-agent. An attacker with physical USB access can inject malicious payloads through crafted filesystem UUIDs.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Local
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- High
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Changed
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Check pam_usb versionRun 'pamusb-agent --version' or 'pamusb-conf --version' to see the installed version. On Debian-based systems, also check via dpkg -l | grep pam-usbAffected if Version is lower than 0.8.7 (e.g., 0.8.6, 0.8.5, etc.)
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Locate pam_usb configuration filesSearch for XML configuration files typically stored in /etc/pamusb or ~/.pamusb, often named *.xml. Run: find /etc -name '*.xml' 2>/dev/null | xargs grep -l 'pamusb' 2>/dev/nullAffected if XML configuration files exist and are readable by the pam_usb service
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Inspect UUID field in device configurationExamine the <device> sections in XML config files for the <uuid> field. Check if the UUID contains shell metacharacters like ;, |, $, `, or backticks that could indicate injectionAffected if UUID field contains unsanitized shell metacharacters or looks abnormally long/complex
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Inspect userName field in service configurationLook for <user> or <userName> entries in the XML configuration files. Verify the username value does not contain shell injection charactersAffected if userName field contains characters like ;, &, |, $(), or backticks used in os.system() calls
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Check if pam_usb authentication is enabledReview PAM configuration in /etc/pam.d/ for entries referencing pam_usb.so or pam_usb. Run: grep -r pam_usb /etc/pam.d/Affected if PAM configuration includes pam_usb module for any service (especially sudo, login, or su)
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Review recent pamusb-conf --reset-pads executionCheck system logs and bash history for execution of pamusb-conf --reset-pads, as this command processes the vulnerable UUID field. Look in /var/log/auth.log or similar for pamusb eventsAffected if pamusb-conf has been run with device configurations containing suspicious UUID values
A system is affected if pam_usb version is below 0.8.7 AND the pam_usb PAM module is enabled AND the XML configuration contains device UUIDs or userName entries that could contain shell injection payloads.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scopedUpgrade to pam_usb version 0.8.7 or later which implements proper input sanitization. Audit existing device configurations and XML files for malicious UUID or userName entries before upgrading.
pam_usb version 0.8.7
- 1. Check the current installed version of pam_usb (e.g., dpkg -l | grep pam-usb or rpm -qa | grep pam-usb)
- 2. Obtain pam_usb version 0.8.7 from the official source (GitHub releases or distribution repository)
- 3. Upgrade the package using your distribution's package manager (apt-get, yum, dnf, or make install from source)
- 4. Verify the new version is installed: pamd-am --version or check package version
- 5. If using a package manager, ensure the repository providing 0.8.7 is configured; if building from source, ensure dependencies are met
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
- Consultation4.0 h
- Implementation2.0 h
- Testing4.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2026-44712 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-44712 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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