CVE-2026-44825
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedHardcoded credentials in the Basic Authentication setup tool (bin/solr auth enable) in Apache Solr versions 9.4.0 through 9.10.1 and 10.0.0 allows a remote attacker to gain full administrative access to the cluster via publicly known default credentials installed silently alongside the user-specified account. As an immediate workaround without upgrading, delete the template users (superadmin, admin, search, index) from security.json or change their passwords. The future, not yet released, versions 9.11.0 and 10.1.0 will not be vulnerable, and it will be enough to upgrade to solve the issue. Not affected: * Clusters where bin/solr auth enable was not used to bootstrap BasicAuth * Clusters where template users have been assigned strong passwords after bootstrap
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceApache Solr's Basic Authentication setup tool (bin/solr auth enable) installs hardcoded default template users (superadmin, admin, search, index) alongside any user-specified account. These publicly known default credentials provide remote attackers with full administrative cluster access.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data>= 9.4.0, <= 9.10.1= 10.0.0CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
-
Check installed Solr versionRun `bin/solr -version` or inspect the version string in the output of `bin/solr status`Affected if The version is 9.4.0 through 9.10.1 inclusive, or exactly 10.0.0
-
Verify if Basic Authentication is enabledRun `bin/solr auth status` or check for the presence of security.json in the server/solr directoryAffected if Basic Authentication has been enabled using `bin/solr auth enable`
-
Inspect security.json for template usersExamine the contents of the security.json file (typically in server/solr/security.json or the ZooKeeper config if using SolrCloud) and look for user entries named superadmin, admin, search, or indexAffected if Any of these four template users (superadmin, admin, search, index) exist in the authentication credentials section of security.json
-
Confirm credentials were not changedReview security.json to verify whether the template user passwords have been changed from their default values (the default passwords are publicly known and match the usernames: superadmin:superadmin, admin:admin, search:search, index:index)Affected if The template users exist with their default password values or with passwords that have not been changed from the known defaults
A user is affected if they run Solr 9.4.0-9.10.1 or 10.0.0, enabled Basic Authentication using bin/solr auth enable, and have not removed or changed the passwords of the template users (superadmin, admin, search, index) from their default values in security.json.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scopedImmediately delete the template users from security.json or change their passwords to strong values. Until fixed versions are available, verify no default credentials remain active.
9.11.0 for Solr 9.x branches; 10.1.0 for Solr 10.x branch
- 1. Identify your current Solr version by running `bin/solr version` or checking the solr-*-release.jar filename
- 2. Backup your current security.json file (typically found in $SOLR_HOME/server/solr/security/security.json or in ZooKeeper if using SolrCloud)
- 3. If running Solr 9.x (9.4.0 through 9.10.1), upgrade to version 9.11.0
- 4. If running Solr 10.0.0, upgrade to version 10.1.0
- 5. After upgrade, verify that the template users (superadmin, admin, search, index) have been removed from security.json
- 6. If the hardcoded users still exist in security.json, manually remove them or change their passwords to strong unique values
- 7. Restart Solr to apply changes
- 8. Verify that authentication works correctly with your intended admin credentials
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
- Consultation2.0 h
- Implementation2.0 h
- Testing2.0 h
- Review / QA1.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $1,984.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2026-44825 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-44825 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
Be the first to add a field note for this CVE — a mitigation you’ve verified, a version caveat, or a link to a working fix. Sign in above to contribute.
A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.
- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data