CVE-2026-44895
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedGitLab MCP Server lets an AI agent talk directly to GitLab. Prior to 0.6.0, the HTTP transport in src/transport.ts ships with no authentication layer at all and a wildcard Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * on every response. The structural defect is that the SSE server stands up a stateful, mutation-capable RPC endpoint that is backed by the operator's GITLAB_PERSONAL_ACCESS_TOKEN without any inbound credential check, then advertises itself to every cross-origin browser context via the wildcard CORS header. The httpServer.listen(port) call at line 97 also passes no host argument, so the bind defaults to 0.0.0.0 and exposes the auth-less surface on every interface. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.6.0.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceGitLab MCP Server versions before 0.6.0 have an unauthenticated HTTP transport that exposes a stateful, mutation-capable RPC endpoint backed by the operator's GITLAB_PERSONAL_ACCESS_TOKEN. The server binds to all interfaces (0.0.0.0) with wildcard CORS, allowing any cross-origin browser context to make authenticated API calls to the user's GitLab instance.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- Authentication
- X
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- X
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify GitLab MCP Server installationLocate the GitLab MCP Server in your environment and determine its running process or installed packageAffected if GitLab MCP Server is installed and running with HTTP transport enabled
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Determine installed versionCheck the version of the GitLab MCP Server (e.g., via --version flag, package manager, or process metadata)Affected if The version is prior to 0.6.0 (any version from initial release up to but not including 0.6.0)
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Verify network binding configurationInspect the server's network configuration or running parameters to determine which interface it binds toAffected if The SSE HTTP server is bound to 0.0.0.0 (all interfaces) rather than localhost only
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Inspect CORS headersSend an HTTP request to the MCP Server endpoint and examine the Access-Control-Allow-Origin response headerAffected if The header is set to '*' (wildcard) allowing any cross-origin access
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Confirm authentication statusReview the server configuration or documentation to verify if inbound authentication is requiredAffected if No authentication layer is required to access the RPC endpoint
You are affected if GitLab MCP Server versions prior to 0.6.0 are running with HTTP transport bound to all interfaces and lacking inbound authentication and CORS restrictions.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scopedUpgrade to GitLab MCP Server 0.6.0 or later which adds proper authentication and restricts CORS; if unable to upgrade, disable the HTTP transport or bind only to localhost.
0.6.0 or later
- Identify the currently installed GitLab MCP Server version using npm list @anthropic-ai/gitlab-mcp-server or your package manager
- Stop any running GitLab MCP Server instances
- Upgrade to version 0.6.0 or later by running: npm update @anthropic-ai/gitlab-mcp-server@latest or npm install @anthropic-ai/[email protected]
- Verify the installed version matches or exceeds 0.6.0
- Restart the GitLab MCP Server with the updated version
- Confirm the service is running correctly and accessible only on intended network interfaces if you were previously exposed
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
- Consultation2.0 h
- Implementation3.0 h
- Testing2.0 h
- Review / QA1.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2026-44895 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-44895 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.
- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data