dbcve.org
Improper Input ValidationWeakness · CWE-20

CVE-2026-45055

HIGH · 8.1 CVSS v3.1 Published 2026-05-13
Mitigation only
No fix yet — a mitigation exists. There is no fixed release. A documented workaround reduces exposure in the meantime.
See remediation →
88/100
Remediation priority · High
Remotely reachable No privileges

Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.

NVD · unedited
CubeCart is an ecommerce software solution. Prior to 6.7.2, CubeCart 6.6.x – 6.7.1 builds CC_STORE_URL directly from the Host request header at bootstrap, with no allowlist. The constant is embedded verbatim into transactional email links, most critically the password-reset link in User::passwordRequest() (and the admin equivalent in Admin::passwordRequest()). An unauthenticated attacker who knows a target email can POST /index.php?_a=recover with Host: evil.com; CubeCart writes a fresh verify token (valid 3,600 s) and emails the victim a link http://evil.com/index.php?_a=recovery&validate=<TOKEN>. The token is valid against the legitimate store — capturing the victim's click on evil.com yields full account takeover, or store takeover when an admin email is targeted. This vulnerability is fixed in 6.7.2.

Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.

dbcve analysis · high confidence

CubeCart versions 6.6.x through 6.7.1 use the Host request header directly to define the CC_STORE_URL constant without validation. This value is embedded in transactional email links, particularly password reset emails. An unauthenticated attacker can send a POST request to /index.php?_a=recover with a malicious Host header (e.g., Host: evil.com), causing the application to email the victim a password reset link pointing to the attacker's domain. The attacker captures the valid token when the victim clicks the link, enabling full account takeover or store takeover if an admin email is targeted.

MitigationUpgrade to CubeCart 6.7.2 or later. Additionally, implement Host header validation against an allowlist of trusted domains at the web server or application level to prevent this class of attack.

Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.

CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.

From the vector
Attack vector
Network
Complexity
Low
Privileges
None
User interaction
Required
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
High
Availability
None

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N

Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.

dbcve checks

Work through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.

  1. Check installed CubeCart version
    Locate the version file or admin panel about section. Common locations include /includes/version.php or the admin dashboard. Compare the version number to the affected range: 6.6.x through 6.7.1.
    Affected if The installed version is 6.6.0 through 6.7.1 inclusive.
  2. Confirm password recovery endpoint is accessible
    Verify the /index.php?_a=recover endpoint responds and accepts POST requests. This is the attack vector for the vulnerability.
    Affected if The password recovery page is accessible and functional.
  3. Inspect CC_STORE_URL configuration
    Examine configuration files (such as includes/config.php or includes/ini files) for how CC_STORE_URL is defined. Look for code that sets this constant based on the Host request header without validation.
    Affected if CC_STORE_URL is being set directly from the HTTP Host header without any allowlist validation.
  4. Review password reset email template
    Locate the password reset email template (typically in skins/*/templates/content/recover.pass.tpl or similar) and examine how the reset link URL is constructed. Check if it uses the CC_STORE_URL constant.
    Affected if The password reset email template embeds CC_STORE_URL in links, and that value can be controlled via the Host header.
  5. Check for Host header validation
    Search the application codebase for Host header validation logic. Look for allowlists or whitelist checks on the Host header before using it in CC_STORE_URL or email generation.
    Affected if No Host header validation exists, or the validation can be bypassed by an attacker.

A user is affected if they run CubeCart version 6.6.0-6.7.1 and the application uses the Host header to construct email links without validation.

Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.

Check your environment

Paste your version and any relevant configuration and it will be compared against the affected criteria above. Do not include secrets or credentials.

AI-assisted, checked against the advisory. Informational, not a guarantee.

Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.

dbcve · scoped
Mitigation available No clean upgrade yet — mitigate in the meantime
Mitigation

Upgrade to CubeCart 6.7.2 or later. Additionally, implement Host header validation against an allowlist of trusted domains at the web server or application level to prevent this class of attack.

Recommended fix High confidence

CubeCart 6.7.2

  1. 1. Backup the existing CubeCart database and all files.
  2. 2. Download CubeCart version 6.7.2 from the official source (cubecart.com or trusted distribution).
  3. 3. Upload and install version 6.7.2, overwriting existing files.
  4. 4. Verify the installation by checking that CC_STORE_URL is now properly validated and not derived directly from the Host header.
  5. 5. Test the password recovery flow to confirm the vulnerability is remediated (reset link should point to the legitimate store domain).

Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.

Have this fixed Scoped from the published advisory
  • Consultation2.0 h
  • Implementation2.0 h
  • Testing3.0 h
  • Review / QA1.0 h
8.0 hours of engineering $1,390
Get help mitigating

An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $2,224.

Scan for this in your stack

Free · runs locally
dbcve dependency scanner

Check whether your project pulls in CVE-2026-45055 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.

Get it on GitHub Scan in the browser

References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.

Primary sources

Practitioner notes

Contributed

Peer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-45055 in production — separate from our analysis above.

No notes yet

Be the first to add a field note for this CVE — a mitigation you’ve verified, a version caveat, or a link to a working fix. Sign in above to contribute.

What this is

A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.

What belongs here
  • Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
  • Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
  • No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
  • No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data