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Improper Input ValidationWeakness · CWE-20

CVE-2026-45137

HIGH · 8.2 CVSS v3.1 Published 2026-05-27
Mitigation only
No fix yet — a mitigation exists. There is no fixed release. A documented workaround reduces exposure in the meantime.
See remediation →
91/100
Remediation priority · Urgent
Remotely reachable No privileges Zero-click

Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.

NVD · unedited
Anchor is a framework providing several convenient developer tools for writing Solana programs. From 1.0.0 to before 1.0.2, an logic error causes anchor programs to accept any program id when requiring the system program id, causing false assumptions resulting in potential arbitrary cpi in programs that invoke system program instructions. In the TryFrom<&'a AccountInfo<'a>> implementation for Program<'a, T>, the id of T is compared with Pubkey::default() to check whether anchor should allow any executable account, or a specific account, because when no T is supplied, T defaults to (), which implements Id::id() by returning Pubkey::default(). This results in T = () and T = System (which has Pubkey::default() as the id) having the same behavior, both allow any executable account. Programs built with anchor assume that the anchor runtime verifies passed in programs of type Program<'a, System> are in fact the system program. This false assumption can lead to arbitrary CPI or payment bypassing when programs try making CPI calls to the system program using the passed in system program due to the fact that the attacker can pass in any program instead of the system program. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.0.2.

Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.

dbcve analysis · high confidence

Anchor framework versions 1.0.0 to before 1.0.2 have a logic error in the TryFrom implementation for Program<'a, T>. The code compares the program ID with Pubkey::default() to determine if any executable account should be allowed. Since both T=() (the default) and T=System return Pubkey::default() as their ID, programs expecting the actual system program can be passed any executable account, enabling arbitrary CPI calls or payment bypassing.

MitigationUpgrade Anchor to version 1.0.2 or later. Review all programs that perform CPI calls to the system program to verify they are not vulnerable to impersonation attacks.

Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.

CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.

From the vector
Attack vector
Network
Complexity
Low
Privileges
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
Low
Integrity
High
Availability
None

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N

Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.

dbcve checks

Work through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.

  1. Check Anchor framework version
    Inspect your Cargo.toml file (or Cargo.lock) for the Anchor framework dependency and note its version. Look for 'anchor-lang' or '@coral-xyz/anchor' in dependencies.
    Affected if The installed version is 1.0.0, 1.0.1, or any version before 1.0.2.
  2. Identify CPI calls using Program<System>
    Search your Anchor program source code for patterns like Program<System>, ctx.accounts.system_program, or invoke_signed to the system program. Review all CPI invocations where the target program is expected to be the system program.
    Affected if Your code uses Program<System> or similar patterns to invoke the system program and the Anchor version is vulnerable.
  3. Check program account validation logic
    Review code that performs program validation using Program<'a, T> where T is expected to be System. Look for anywhere your program trusts the Anchor-provided program validation for system program checks.
    Affected if Your programs rely on Anchor's Program<System> type to verify the system program is the correct target before CPI calls.

You are affected if you use Anchor versions 1.0.0 to before 1.0.2 and your programs make CPI calls that rely on Program<System> for validation, as the framework will accept any program instead of strictly requiring the system program.

Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.

Check your environment

Paste your version and any relevant configuration and it will be compared against the affected criteria above. Do not include secrets or credentials.

AI-assisted, checked against the advisory. Informational, not a guarantee.

Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.

dbcve · scoped
Mitigation available No clean upgrade yet — mitigate in the meantime
Mitigation

Upgrade Anchor to version 1.0.2 or later. Review all programs that perform CPI calls to the system program to verify they are not vulnerable to impersonation attacks.

Recommended fix High confidence

Anchor version 1.0.2

  1. Update the Anchor framework dependency in your project's Cargo.toml to version 1.0.2 or later
  2. Run cargo update to fetch the new dependencies
  3. Rebuild your Anchor program using anchor build to ensure the fixed version is compiled
  4. Redeploy your program to Solana mainnet/testnet using anchor deploy
  5. Verify the program functions correctly and test any system program CPI calls to confirm the vulnerability is mitigated

Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.

Have this fixed Scoped from the published advisory
  • Consultation4.0 h
  • Implementation8.0 h
  • Testing16.0 h
  • Review / QA6.0 h
34.0 hours of engineering $5,720
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References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.

Primary sources

Practitioner notes

Contributed

Peer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-45137 in production — separate from our analysis above.

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What this is

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What belongs here
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  • Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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