CVE-2026-45259
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedsigqueue(2) was marked as permitted in capability mode with the introduction of Capsicum in 2011, but the implementation of kern_sigqueue did not include a capability mode check restricting signal delivery to the calling process's own PID. A process in capability mode can use sigqueue(2) to send signals to any process it could signal following standard Unix permissions, bypassing the Capsicum sandbox restriction. A compromised sandboxed process could interfere with other processes, for example by sending SIGKILL or SIGSTOP. This could be any process running as the same user, or any process, for a superuser sandboxed process.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceIn FreeBSD, sigqueue(2) was permitted in capability mode when Capsicum was introduced in 2011, but the kern_sigqueue implementation lacked a capability mode check to restrict signal delivery to the calling process's own PID. This allows sandboxed processes to send signals (including SIGKILL/SIGSTOP) to any process they could signal under standard Unix permissions, bypassing Capsicum's sandbox restrictions.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data= 14.3= 14.4= 15.0CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Local
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Changed
- Confidentiality
- None
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:N/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Check FreeBSD versionRun 'uname -r' or 'freebsd-version -k' to get the installed FreeBSD versionAffected if The version is 14.3, 14.4, or 15.0
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Identify capability mode processesSearch for processes that call cap_enter() or check for 'capsicum' in process capabilities using 'procstat -ac' or examining application code for Capsicum API usageAffected if Applications are using Capsicum capability mode (cap_enter) and have permission to send signals to other processes
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Verify signal permissions for sandboxed processesUse 'ps -o pid,ppid,comm' to identify processes in capability mode, then review their signal permissions using 'procstat -s <pid>' or audit which targets they can signal via Unix permissionsAffected if A sandboxed process can signal processes outside its own PID (excluding root-owned or specially privileged signal restrictions)
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Check for sigqueue usageReview application code or monitor for sigqueue(2) or kill(2) system calls from sandboxed processes using dtrace, strace equivalent (truss), or system call tracingAffected if Sandboxed processes are actively using sigqueue to deliver signals to targets other than their own process ID
You are affected if running FreeBSD 14.3, 14.4, or 15.0 and running applications in Capsicum capability mode that can send signals to processes other than themselves.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataApply the FreeBSD security patch for CVE-2026-45259 which adds the missing capability mode check in kern_sigqueue to restrict signal delivery to the sandboxed process's own PID. Until patched, minimize the use of capability mode with processes that have significant Unix signal permissions.
- Consultation4.0 h
- Implementation8.0 h
- Testing12.0 h
- Review / QA6.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $8,192.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2026-45259 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-45259 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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