CVE-2026-45550
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedRoxy-WI is a web interface for managing Haproxy, Nginx, Apache and Keepalived servers. In versions 8.2.6.4 and prior, PUT /smon/check (app/routes/smon/routes.py:117-138) gates only on roxywi_common.check_user_group_for_flask() — which validates that the caller has some group, not that the target check_id belongs to it. The downstream SQL update functions update_smon, update_smonHttp, update_smonTcp, update_smonPing, update_smonDns (app/modules/db/smon.py:515-562) all execute WHERE smon_id = ? with no user_group filter. The DELETE path is correctly filtered (app/modules/db/smon.py:319-327 does WHERE id = ? AND user_group = ?), demonstrating that the maintainers know the right pattern but did not apply it on UPDATE. Therefore any authenticated user can iterate over smon_id values and silently rewrite any other tenant's HTTP / TCP / Ping / DNS monitoring check. At time of publication, there are no publicly available patches.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceRoxy-WI versions 8.2.6.4 and prior have a broken access control vulnerability in the PUT /smon/check endpoint. The check_user_group_for_flask() function only verifies the caller belongs to some group, not that the target check_id belongs to that group. The SQL UPDATE functions (update_smon, update_smonHttp, update_smonTcp, update_smonPing, update_smonDns) lack user_group filters in their WHERE clauses, allowing any authenticated user to modify other tenants' monitoring configurations by iterating over smon_id values.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Changed
- Confidentiality
- Low
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- Low
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:H/A:L
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
-
Identify installed Roxy-WI versionLocate the Roxy-WI version information typically displayed in the web UI footer or in a VERSION file within the installation directory. Compare this version against the affected range: 8.2.6.4 and prior.Affected if The installed version is 8.2.6.4 or lower.
-
Verify PUT method is enabled on /smon/check endpointSend an HTTP PUT request to the /smon/check endpoint using a valid authenticated session with minimal privileges. Observe if the request is accepted or rejected.Affected if The endpoint accepts PUT requests without returning a 403 Forbidden or authentication error.
-
Confirm multi-tenancy user group isolation is enforcedLog in as a low-privilege user belonging to one user group. Attempt to access or modify a smon_id that belongs to a different user group via the /smon/check endpoint. Check if the application rejects the cross-group request.Affected if The application allows modification of smon_id values belonging to other user groups, indicating missing user_group filtering in the SQL UPDATE operations.
-
Inspect SQL UPDATE function definitionsIf source code access is available, examine the update_smon, update_smonHttp, update_smonTcp, update_smonPing, and update_smonDns functions. Verify whether the WHERE clauses contain user_group filters that restrict records to the authenticated user's group.Affected if The SQL UPDATE functions lack user_group constraints in their WHERE clauses, allowing cross-tenant modifications.
A user is affected if they run Roxy-WI version 8.2.6.4 or prior AND the /smon/check PUT endpoint is exposed to authenticated users who should not have cross-tenant access to monitoring configurations.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scopedSince no patch exists, restrict network access to the Roxy-WI interface and implement compensating controls such as aggressive rate limiting or Web Application Firewall rules to detect anomalous smon_id access patterns.
- Roxy-WI versions 8.2.6.4 and prior contain an IDOR vulnerability in the PUT /smon/check endpoint (app/routes/smon/routes.py:117-138) that allows any authenticated user to modify monitoring checks belonging to other tenant groups
- The vulnerability exists because the endpoint only validates the user has some group membership via roxywi_common.check_user_group_for_flask() but does not verify the target check_id belongs to that user's group
- The affected UPDATE functions (update_smon, update_smonHttp, update_smonTcp, update_smonPing, update_smonDns in app/modules/db/smon.py:515-562) execute WHERE smon_id = ? without any user_group filter
- Note: The DELETE path (app/modules/db/smon.py:319-327) correctly includes WHERE id = ? AND user_group = ?, demonstrating the maintainers understand the correct pattern but failed to apply it to UPDATE operations
- At time of CVE publication, no patches are publicly available
- Monitor the official Roxy-WI repository (github.com) for security releases addressing this authorization bypass
- Consider implementing network-level isolation or Web Application Firewall (WAF) rules to limit exposure until an official patch is released
- Review user access logs for suspicious patterns of smon_id enumeration that could indicate exploitation attempts
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
- Consultation4.0 h
- Implementation8.0 h
- Testing6.0 h
- Review / QA4.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $6,176.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2026-45550 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-45550 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
Be the first to add a field note for this CVE — a mitigation you’ve verified, a version caveat, or a link to a working fix. Sign in above to contribute.
A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.
- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data