CVE-2026-45552
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedRoxy-WI is a web interface for managing Haproxy, Nginx, Apache and Keepalived servers. In versions 8.2.6.4 and prior, the install blueprint declares only bp.before_request → @jwt_required() (app/routes/install/routes.py:36-39). The individual endpoints install_exporter, install_waf, install_geoip, check_geoip, get_exporter_version, and get_task_status are not wrapped in page_for_admin and do not call roxywi_common.is_user_has_access_to_its_group(server_ip) or check_is_server_in_group(server_ip). Only the GET index page (install_monitoring) gates on roxywi_auth.page_for_admin(level=2). Because the missing decorators omit both role and group checks, any logged-in user — including the default guest role 4 — can install/reconfigure exporters, WAF, and GeoIP databases on every server in the Roxy-WI database, regardless of tenant ownership. The Ansible playbooks run with the per-server SSH credential stored in Roxy-WI, which the credentials' rightful owner (a different tenant) has provisioned with sudo rights for the management workflow. At time of publication, there are no publicly available patches.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceThe install blueprint in Roxy-WI versions 8.2.6.4 and prior lacks function-level access controls on six endpoints (install_exporter, install_waf, install_geoip, check_geoip, get_exporter_version, get_task_status). These endpoints only have JWT authentication via bp.before_request but miss the page_for_admin decorator and group ownership validation functions (is_user_has_access_to_its_group, check_is_server_in_group), allowing any authenticated user including guest role 4 to execute Ansible playbooks that install/reconfigure exporters, WAF, and GeoIP databases on all servers regardless of tenant ownership.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Changed
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify Roxy-WI versionLocate the Roxy-WI installation directory and check the version file or initial login page which typically displays the installed version numberAffected if The installed version is 8.2.6.4 or any version prior to it
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Locate the install blueprint endpointsInspect the Roxy-WI source code in the blueprints or routes directory for files containing the endpoints: install_exporter, install_waf, install_geoip, check_geoip, get_exporter_version, get_task_statusAffected if These six endpoints exist in the codebase
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Verify decorator on vulnerable endpointsOpen each of the six endpoint files and examine whether the page_for_admin decorator is applied to the route handler functionsAffected if The page_for_admin decorator is absent from any of the six endpoints
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Check for group ownership validationWithin each of the six endpoint functions, search for calls to is_user_has_access_to_its_group or check_is_server_in_group validation functionsAffected if Neither validation function is called within these endpoint handlers
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Inspect JWT authentication configurationExamine the bp.before_request function in the install blueprint to confirm JWT token validation is the sole authentication mechanismAffected if JWT authentication is enabled but no role or permission checks occur after authentication
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Test guest role accessLog in with a guest account (role 4) and attempt to access or trigger one of the six install endpoints via API call or web requestAffected if A guest user can successfully access and execute operations on these endpoints
A user is affected if they run Roxy-WI version 8.2.6.4 or prior AND the install blueprint endpoints lack the page_for_admin decorator AND group ownership validation is not performed, allowing any authenticated user including guest role to execute sensitive install operations.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataApply the page_for_admin decorator with appropriate permission levels and implement group ownership validation functions on all install endpoints to enforce role-based and tenant-based access controls; network-segment management interfaces until patches are available.
- Consultation4.0 h
- Implementation8.0 h
- Testing6.0 h
- Review / QA4.0 h
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Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2026-45552 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-45552 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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