dbcve.org
Improper Input ValidationWeakness · CWE-20

CVE-2026-45558

CRITICAL · 9.9 CVSS v3.1 Published 2026-06-10
Mitigation only
No fix yet — a mitigation exists. There is no fixed release. A documented workaround reduces exposure in the meantime.
See remediation →
100/100
Remediation priority · Urgent
Remotely reachable Zero-click

Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.

NVD · unedited
Roxy-WI is a web interface for managing Haproxy, Nginx, Apache and Keepalived servers. In versions 8.2.6.4 and prior, the HAProxy section-save endpoints (POST /api/service/haproxy/<server_id>/section/<section_type> and the PUT / global / defaults variants) accept a JSON option field that is not validated, not escaped, and is rendered verbatim into the generated HAProxy configuration via the section.j2, global.j2, and defaults.j2 Ansible templates. Because Roxy-WI then pushes the generated config to the load balancer and runs systemctl reload haproxy, an authenticated user with role ≤ 3 (user) can inject arbitrary HAProxy directives into the config that runs on every load balancer their group manages — including option external-check + external-check command /bin/bash -c '…', which gives remote code execution on the load balancer as the haproxy user on every health-check tick. At time of publication, there are no publicly available patches.

Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.

dbcve analysis · high confidence

Roxy-WI versions 8.2.6.4 and prior have an unauthenticated (but requires role ≤ 3 user) injection vulnerability in HAProxy section-save API endpoints. The JSON option field accepts unsanitized input that is directly embedded into HAProxy configuration templates (section.j2, global.j2, defaults.j2) without validation or escaping. When Roxy-WI pushes the generated config and reloads HAProxy, authenticated users can inject arbitrary HAProxy directives including 'option external-check command /bin/bash' to achieve remote code execution as the haproxy user.

MitigationSince no patch exists, restrict API access to trusted users only, implement network segmentation, and disable the external-check feature in HAProxy configurations where not required. Consider disabling the affected API endpoints at the web server level until a fix is available.

Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.

CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.

From the vector
Attack vector
Network
Complexity
Low
Privileges
Low
User interaction
None
Scope
Changed
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
High
Availability
High

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.

dbcve checks

Work through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.

  1. Identify Roxy-WI installation and version
    Locate the Roxy-WI installation directory and check the version file or metadata. Compare the installed version number to 8.2.6.4 - any version equal to or lower than 8.2.6.4 is affected.
    Affected if Installed Roxy-WI version is 8.2.6.4 or lower
  2. Verify API endpoint exposure
    Check network configuration to confirm if the Roxy-WI web interface and API endpoints (particularly /api/service/haproxy/ and /api/global/defaults) are accessible from network locations beyond localhost or trusted admin IPs.
    Affected if API endpoints are exposed to untrusted networks or the internet
  3. Inspect HAProxy configuration for external-check directives
    Locate and review the HAProxy configuration files generated or managed by Roxy-WI. Search for 'option external-check' or 'external-check command' directives in any backend, listen, or frontend sections.
    Affected if HAProxy configuration contains 'option external-check' or 'external-check command' directives, especially pointing to shell commands like /bin/bash
  4. Check HAProxy process execution
    Review running HAProxy processes on the load balancer. Look for external-check processes or unusual command executions associated with HAProxy, such as spawning shell interpreters.
    Affected if HAProxy is running with external-check enabled or spawning unexpected child processes
  5. Audit Roxy-WI user accounts and roles
    Query the Roxy-WI user database or configuration to enumerate accounts and their assigned role values. Identify any users with role value of 3 or lower.
    Affected if There exist users with role ≤ 3 (user, operator, or similar privileged roles) in Roxy-WI, especially if default credentials are in use
  6. Review HAProxy configuration for unexpected directives
    Examine current HAProxy configuration managed by Roxy-WI for any directives that were not intentionally configured. Look for anomalies such as unfamiliar backend servers, acl rules, or http-response actions that may indicate injection.
    Affected if HAProxy configuration contains directives that were not intentionally added or that reference unexpected external commands or scripts

A user is affected if Roxy-WI version 8.2.6.4 or lower is running with its API endpoints accessible, combined with HAProxy using external-check or the presence of authenticated users with low role privileges in Roxy-WI.

Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.

Check your environment

Paste your version and any relevant configuration and it will be compared against the affected criteria above. Do not include secrets or credentials.

AI-assisted, checked against the advisory. Informational, not a guarantee.

Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.

dbcve · scoped
Mitigation available No clean upgrade yet — mitigate in the meantime
Mitigation

Since no patch exists, restrict API access to trusted users only, implement network segmentation, and disable the external-check feature in HAProxy configurations where not required. Consider disabling the affected API endpoints at the web server level until a fix is available.

Recommended fix Moderate confidence
  1. Restrict access to the Roxy-WI web interface to only trusted administrators via network segmentation or firewall rules
  2. Review and audit all user accounts in Roxy-WI, ensuring users are assigned roles > 3 (higher privilege levels) to prevent low-privilege users from accessing the vulnerable API endpoints
  3. Monitor HAProxy configuration files for any unauthorized or unexpected directives, particularly option external-check commands
  4. Implement additional authentication mechanisms (such as MFA) for Roxy-WI access to reduce the risk of authenticated exploitation
  5. Consider implementing WAF rules to detect and block suspicious requests to /api/service/haproxy/* endpoints with anomalous JSON payloads
  6. Log and alert on any systemctl reload haproxy commands triggered by Roxy-WI to detect potential exploitation activity

Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.

Have this fixed Scoped from the published advisory
  • Consultation8.0 h
  • Implementation24.0 h
  • Testing12.0 h
  • Review / QA8.0 h
52.0 hours of engineering $9,160
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References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.

Primary sources

Practitioner notes

Contributed

Peer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-45558 in production — separate from our analysis above.

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What this is

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What belongs here
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  • Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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