CVE-2026-45674
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedNetty is a network application framework for development of protocol servers and clients. Prior to versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final, Netty's DnsResolveContext fails to validate the origin (bailiwick) of CNAME records in DNS responses. Versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final patch the issue.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceNetty's DnsResolveContext does not validate the origin (bailiwick) of CNAME records in DNS responses before versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final. This allows attackers to inject malicious CNAME records pointing to arbitrary domains, potentially enabling DNS rebinding or cache poisoning attacks.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data< 4.1.135>= 4.2.0, < 4.2.15CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Changed
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- None
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify installed Netty versionCheck your project's dependency management file (Maven pom.xml, Gradle build.gradle) or inspect the netty-common JAR manifest for the version attribute. Run: grep -r 'netty' pom.xml or list the netty-*.jar files in your classpath.Affected if The Netty version is below 4.1.135 or between 4.2.0 and 4.2.14 (inclusive)
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Confirm netty-resolver dependency is in useVerify that the netty-resolver or netty-resolver-dns module is included in your application dependencies. This module contains DnsResolveContext. Check your build dependencies or runtime classpath.Affected if The netty-resolver-dns module is present in your runtime dependencies
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Determine if DNS resolution is performedInspect code for usage of DnsNameResolver, DnsResolveContext, or related DNS resolution classes. Search for imports of io.netty.resolver.dns.* or calls to resolve methods on DnsNameResolver.Affected if Your application uses DnsNameResolver or DnsResolveContext to resolve DNS records
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Check if CNAME processing occursReview whether your DNS resolver configuration processes CNAME records. This is the default behavior in DnsResolveContext when handling DNS responses. Examine any custom DnsRecordResolver or DnsNameResolverBuilder configurations.Affected if The default DNS resolution path is used, which automatically processes CNAME records from responses
You are affected if your application uses Netty's DNS resolver (netty-resolver-dns) with a version in the vulnerable range (below 4.1.135 or between 4.2.0 and 4.2.14) and processes CNAME records from DNS responses, as the missing bailiwick validation allows malicious CNAME injection.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scoped4.1.1354.2.15
Upgrade Netty to version 4.1.135.Final or 4.2.15.Final or later. If immediate upgrade is not possible, implement additional DNS response validation at the application layer.
4.1.135.Final (for 4.1.x users) or 4.2.15.Final (for 4.2.x users)
- Identify the current Netty version in use by checking project dependencies (Maven pom.xml, Gradle build.gradle, or similar)
- For Maven projects, update the netty version in pom.xml to 4.1.135.Final (for 4.1.x line) or 4.2.15.Final (for 4.2.x line)
- For Gradle projects, update the netty dependency version to '4.1.135.Final' or '4.2.15.Final'
- Run dependency resolution to verify the correct version is pulled (e.g., mvn dependency:tree or gradle dependencies)
- Rebuild the project and run tests to ensure the upgrade does not break existing functionality
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
- Consultation3.0 h
- Implementation2.0 h
- Testing4.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $3,072.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2026-45674 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sources- github.com
- github.com
- github.com
- access.redhat.com
- access.redhat.com
- access.redhat.com
- access.redhat.com
- access.redhat.com
- access.redhat.com
- access.redhat.com
- access.redhat.com
- access.redhat.com
- access.redhat.com
- access.redhat.com
- access.redhat.com
- access.redhat.com
- access.redhat.com
- bugzilla.redhat.com
- security.access.redhat.com
- nvd.nist.gov
Practitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-45674 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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