CVE-2026-45677
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedRocket.Chat is an open-source, secure, fully customizable communications platform. Prior to 8.5.0, 8.4.1, 8.3.3, 8.2.3, 8.1.4, 8.0.5, 7.13.7, and 7.10.11, Rocket.Chat's SAML integration does not verify the signature on inbound LogoutRequest messages. An unauthenticated remote attacker who knows a target user's SAML NameID - which major identity providers (Okta, Google Workspace, Microsoft Entra ID, JumpCloud) expose as the user's email address - can craft a valid-looking unsigned LogoutRequest and submit it to the SP logout endpoint. The server processes it as legitimate, immediately destroying the victim's session. Because the attack requires no authentication and no interaction from the victim, it can be repeated in a loop against individual users or scripted across many accounts, effectively rendering the Rocket.Chat instance unusable for SAML-authenticated users. This vulnerability is fixed in 8.5.0, 8.4.1, 8.3.3, 8.2.3, 8.1.4, 8.0.5, 7.13.7, and 7.10.11.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceRocket.Chat's SAML integration fails to verify signatures on inbound LogoutRequest messages, allowing unauthenticated attackers with knowledge of a user's SAML NameID (typically email address) to craft valid-looking unsigned logout requests that destroy victim sessions without authentication or interaction.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- Authentication
- X
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- X
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify Rocket.Chat installation and versionLocate the Rocket.Chat installation and determine its installed version number (for example, via package manager, docker image tag, or application About page)Affected if The installed version is earlier than 7.10.11, 7.13.7, 8.0.5, 8.1.4, 8.2.3, 8.3.3, 8.4.1, or 8.5.0
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Verify SAML authentication is configuredCheck whether SAML-based authentication (such as SAML 2.0) is enabled in the Rocket.Chat settings or configurationAffected if SAML authentication is active and users log in via a SAML Identity Provider
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Confirm SAML Single Logout (SLO) is in useExamine the SAML configuration to determine if Single Logout (SLO) or LogoutRequest handling is enabled or configuredAffected if SAML SLO/LogoutRequest processing is configured, as this is the vulnerable code path
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Check if signature verification is enforced on LogoutRequestInspect the SAML settings or configuration files for an option controlling LogoutRequest signature verification (if such a setting exists and is documented)Affected if Signature verification on inbound LogoutRequest messages is not enforced or is disabled
A user is affected if Rocket.Chat is running a version prior to the fixed releases AND SAML authentication with LogoutRequest handling is enabled, allowing unauthenticated session destruction via unsigned SAML logout requests.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scopedUpgrade Rocket.Chat to version 8.5.0, 8.4.1, 8.3.3, 8.2.3, 8.1.4, 8.0.5, 7.13.7, or 7.10.11 (or later) which includes signature verification for LogoutRequest messages.
Upgrade to Rocket.Chat 8.5.0 (or latest 8.x) or 7.10.11 (or latest 7.x), depending on your current major version branch
- Identify the currently installed Rocket.Chat version by checking the server or admin panel
- Determine which upgrade path applies: if currently on 7.x, upgrade to at least 7.10.11; if on 8.x, upgrade to at least 8.5.0 (or the latest 8.x release)
- Back up the Rocket.Chat database and configuration files before upgrading
- Follow the official Rocket.Chat upgrade documentation for your deployment method (Snap, Docker, or manual)
- For Docker: stop the container, pull the new image (e.g., `docker pull rocket.chat:8.5.0`), then start with the updated image
- For Snap: run `sudo snap refresh rocketchat-server` to get the latest version
- For manual/DEB: update the package repository and run `apt-get update && apt-get install rocketchat`
- After upgrade, verify the SAML configuration still works correctly by testing a SAML login and logout cycle
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
- Consultation3.0 h
- Implementation3.0 h
- Testing4.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
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Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2026-45677 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-45677 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data