CVE-2026-46395
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedHAX CMS helps manage microsite universe with PHP or NodeJs backends. Prior to version 26.0.0, the `hmacBase64()` function in the HAXcms Node.js backend contains two critical cryptographic implementation errors that together allow any unauthenticated attacker to extract the system’s private signing key and forge arbitrary admin-level JSON Web Tokens (JWTs) allowing them to get full admin access with a single HTTP request. First, the function passes the literal string "0" as the HMAC signing key instead of the key parameter, making every HAXcms instance compute identical HMACs for the same input. Then, after computing the HMAC, the function concatenates the real key parameter which is "this.privateKey + this.salt", the system’s master signing secret is directly onto the output. The combined buffer is base64-encoded and returned as the token. Every base64url token produced has the same structure: 32 bytes HMAC keyed with "0" and N bytes of `privateKey+salt`. An attacker base64-decodes any token, discards the first 32 bytes, and reads the private key directly. The `/system/api/connectionSettings` endpoint is unauthenticated and returns multiple tokens generated by this function. A single GET request to this endpoint exposes the private key. The PHP backend implements this function correctly with the actual key and returns only the hash. The PHP version produces 44-character tokens whereas the broken Node.js version produces 139+ character tokens. Version 26.0.0 fixes the issue.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceThe HAX CMS Node.js backend's hmacBase64() function has two critical flaws: it uses literal string '0' as the HMAC signing key instead of the actual key, and then concatenates the real privateKey+salt to the HMAC output before base64 encoding. The unauthenticated /system/api/connectionSettings endpoint exposes tokens that can be base64-decoded to extract the private key, allowing attackers to forge admin JWTs.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- Authentication
- X
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- X
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify HAX CMS installation and versionLocate the HAX CMS installation directory or running service, then check the package.json or version file to determine the installed version numberAffected if The installed version is earlier than 26.0.0
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Verify the hmacBase64() function implementationLocate the Node.js backend source code and inspect the hmacBase64() function in the authentication or signing moduleAffected if The function uses literal '0' as the HMAC key instead of retrieving the actual private key from configuration
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Check if the connectionSettings endpoint is exposedAttempt to access the /system/api/connectionSettings endpoint via HTTP GET request without authentication credentialsAffected if The endpoint responds with any data, especially token or key-related information, without requiring authentication
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Inspect returned tokens for private key exposureBase64-decode any tokens or credentials returned from the /system/api/connectionSettings endpoint and examine the decoded contentAffected if The decoded content contains privateKey or salt values that should not be exposed
A user is affected if running HAX CMS version earlier than 26.0.0 with the unauthenticated /system/api/connectionSettings endpoint accessible and returning tokens that expose private key material.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scopedUpgrade to HAX CMS version 26.0.0 or later and immediately rotate the compromised private signing key and salt since exposure is guaranteed.
Version 26.0.0
- 1. Identify all HAXcms Node.js backend installations in your environment running versions prior to 26.0.0
- 2. Before upgrading, take a full backup of the system including configuration files and the database
- 3. Upgrade the HAXcms Node.js backend to version 26.0.0 or later
- 4. After upgrading, rotate the private signing key (privateKey + salt) immediately as a precaution
- 5. Verify the fix by checking that the `/system/api/connectionSettings` endpoint no longer returns tokens containing the private key in plain text
- 6. Invalidate any existing JWT tokens and require re-authentication for all users
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
- Consultation2.0 h
- Implementation2.0 h
- Testing2.0 h
- Review / QA1.0 h
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Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2026-46395 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-46395 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data