CVE-2026-46423
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedRocket.Chat is an open-source, secure, fully customizable communications platform. Prior to 8.5.0, 8.4.1, 8.3.3, 8.2.3, 8.1.4, 8.0.5, 7.13.7, and 7.10.11, Rocket.Chat's SAML service provider implementation silently skips both SAML Response and Assertion signature validation when the configured IdP certificate field is empty. The verifySignatures routine performs an early return when serviceProviderOptions.cert is falsy, which is the default state of the setting. Because provider registration only gates on the SAML "enabled" toggle and not on the presence of a certificate, an administrator who enables SAML without pasting an IdP certificate obtains a fully wired, publicly reachable SAML login endpoint that accepts unsigned or attacker-supplied assertions. This is a default-configuration authentication-bypass class: the fail-open branch is reached with no misconfiguration beyond leaving a field at its shipped default. This vulnerability is fixed in 8.5.0, 8.4.1, 8.3.3, 8.2.3, 8.1.4, 8.0.5, 7.13.7, and 7.10.11.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceRocket.Chat's SAML service provider implementation skips signature validation when the IdP certificate field is empty. The verifySignatures routine performs an early return when serviceProviderOptions.cert is falsy (the default), allowing unsigned or attacker-supplied SAML assertions to be accepted, enabling full authentication bypass.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- Authentication
- X
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- X
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Confirm Rocket.Chat installationIdentify the Rocket.Chat server and determine its installed version by inspecting the package.json file, the administration panel, or the running service processAffected if The installed version falls within affected ranges (prior to 8.5.0, 8.4.1, 8.3.3, 8.2.3, 8.1.4, 8.0.5, 7.13.7, or 7.10.11)
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Determine if SAML authentication is enabledReview the Rocket.Chat SAML configuration settings through the administration panel or by inspecting the configuration database/JSON files where SAML settings are storedAffected if SAML authentication is enabled as an authentication method in the environment
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Inspect the IdP certificate configurationLocate the SAML service provider configuration and examine the serviceProviderOptions.cert field or the IdP certificate setting; check whether a valid certificate value is populated or if the field is empty/null/unsetAffected if The IdP certificate field is empty, null, or falsy (the default unset state)
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Verify signature validation behaviorReview the verifySignatures configuration within the SAML settings or examine the authentication workflow logs to confirm whether signature validation is activeAffected if Signature validation is disabled or bypassed due to missing certificate configuration
The environment is affected if Rocket.Chat with a vulnerable version has SAML enabled and the IdP certificate field is empty or falsy, allowing unsigned SAML assertions to be accepted.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scopedUpgrade to fixed versions (8.5.0, 8.4.1, 8.3.3, 8.2.3, 8.1.4, 8.0.5, 7.13.7, or 7.10.11) and ensure a valid IdP certificate is configured before enabling SAML authentication.
8.5.0 (or latest 8.x fixed version: 8.5.0; alternatively 8.4.1, 8.3.3, 8.2.3, 8.1.4, 8.0.5, 7.13.7, or 7.10.11 depending on your current major version)
- 1. Identify current Rocket.Chat version by checking the deployed version
- 2. Determine appropriate upgrade target: for major version 8.x, upgrade to 8.5.0 or 8.4.1; for version 8.3.x upgrade to 8.3.3; for 8.2.x upgrade to 8.2.3; for 8.1.x upgrade to 8.1.4; for 8.0.x upgrade to 8.0.5; for 7.x upgrade to 7.13.7 or 7.10.11
- 3. Perform complete backup of Rocket.Chat database and configuration
- 4. Stop Rocket.Chat services
- 5. Upgrade Rocket.Chat to the chosen fixed version using standard upgrade procedure for your deployment method
- 6. After upgrade, access Rocket.Chat admin panel and navigate to SAML settings
- 7. Verify that IdP certificate field is populated with a valid certificate - do not leave it empty
- 8. Enable and test SAML authentication to confirm signatures are now properly validated
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
- Consultation2.0 h
- Implementation4.0 h
- Testing3.0 h
- Review / QA1.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2026-46423 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-46423 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data