CVE-2026-46432
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedLMDeploy is a toolkit for compressing, deploying, and serving large language models. In versions 0.12.3 and prior, LMDeploy is vulnerable to arbitrary code execution through hardcoded "trust_remote_code=True" in multiple HuggingFace model-loading call sites. At time of publication, there are no publicly available patches.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceLMDeploy versions 0.12.3 and prior contain hardcoded 'trust_remote_code=True' in HuggingFace model-loading call sites. This setting allows arbitrary code execution if a user loads a malicious model, as the model's code executes within LMDeploy's context without validation.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Local
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Check installed LMDeploy versionRun 'pip show lmdeploy' or execute 'python -c "import lmdeploy; print(lmdeploy.__version__)"' to retrieve the installed versionAffected if The installed version is 0.12.3 or lower
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Locate HuggingFace model-loading call sitesSearch the LMDeploy codebase for model loading functions such as from_pretrained, pipeline, or AutoModel calls that interact with HuggingFace modelsAffected if Any HuggingFace model loading call sites are found in the codebase
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Inspect trust_remote_code parameter in model loading callsExamine each HuggingFace model-loading call site to determine whether trust_remote_code is explicitly set to True or defaults to TrueAffected if Any model-loading call site hardcodes or defaults trust_remote_code=True
You are affected if LMDeploy version is 0.12.3 or prior AND any HuggingFace model loading call sites in your deployment use trust_remote_code=True to load models.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scopedUntil an official patch is released, avoid loading models from untrusted sources. Manually review and modify the codebase to disable trust_remote_code=True or implement model validation before loading.
- 1. Audit all codebases using LMDeploy for HuggingFace model loading calls (model.from_pretrained or similar)
- 2. Identify all instances where trust_remote_code is not explicitly set (defaults to True) or explicitly set to True
- 3. For each model loading call, explicitly set trust_remote_code=False if the model does not require custom code execution
- 4. If a model legitimately requires trust_remote_code=True for custom model code, verify the model's provenance: ensure it is from a trusted source, review the model's code for malicious content, and consider hosting a local copy
- 5. Implement a global configuration in LMDeploy to default trust_remote_code to False across all model loading operations
- 6. Add model source allow-listing/verification to ensure only trusted HuggingFace repos or local paths are loaded
- 7. Implement logging/monitoring around model loading to detect unauthorized code execution attempts
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
- Consultation3.0 h
- Implementation12.0 h
- Testing6.0 h
- Review / QA4.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $7,008.
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Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2026-46432 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-46432 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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