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CamelApplication · Apache

CVE-2026-46453

MEDIUM · 5.3 CVSS v3.1 Published 2026-07-06
Fix available
A fix is available. Upgrade to 4.14.8 / 4.18.3 or later.
See remediation →
62/100
Remediation priority · Elevated
Remotely reachable No privileges Zero-click 6 weeks old

Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.

NVD · unedited
Improper Input Validation, Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key vulnerability in Apache Camel ElasticSearch Rest Client. The camel-elasticsearch-rest-client component reads several Exchange headers to control its behaviour - SEARCH_QUERY (an advanced query body), OPERATION (which Elasticsearch operation to run), INDEX_NAME, INDEX_SETTINGS and ID. The string values of these header constants, defined in ElasticSearchRestClientConstant, are plain unprefixed names ('SEARCH_QUERY', 'OPERATION', 'INDEX_NAME', 'INDEX_SETTINGS', 'ID') rather than the 'Camel'-prefixed names used by every other Camel component (for example CamelSqlQuery, CamelMongoDbCriteria, CamelCqlQuery). Camel's inbound HTTP header filter, HttpHeaderFilterStrategy, blocks only header names that begin with 'Camel' or 'camel'. Because the Elasticsearch header names do not carry that prefix, they pass through the inbound filter unchanged. When a Camel route exposes an HTTP entry point (for example platform-http) in front of an elasticsearch-rest-client producer, an untrusted HTTP client can set these headers directly on its request and override the query and operation that the route author configured: reading every document in the index (SEARCH_QUERY with a match_all query), deleting documents (OPERATION set to Delete together with ID), or exfiltrating selected fields. No credentials are required and the producer reads the headers unconditionally. This issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.3.0 before 4.14.8, from 4.15.0 before 4.18.3, from 4.19.0 before 4.21.0. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 4.21.0, which fixes the issue. If users are on the 4.14.x LTS releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.14.8. If users are on the 4.18.x releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.18.3. The fix renames the camel-elasticsearch-rest-client Exchange header constant string values (ID, SEARCH_QUERY, INDEX_SETTINGS, INDEX_NAME, OPERATION) to carry the Camel prefix (CamelElasticsearchId, CamelElasticsearchSearchQuery, CamelElasticsearchIndexSettings, CamelElasticsearchIndexName, CamelElasticsearchOperation) so that they are blocked by the inbound HttpHeaderFilterStrategy; the Java field names are unchanged. For deployments that cannot upgrade immediately, strip the affected headers from untrusted inbound messages before they reach the producer (for example removeHeader('SEARCH_QUERY'), removeHeader('OPERATION'), removeHeader('INDEX_NAME'), removeHeader('INDEX_SETTINGS') and removeHeader('ID') in front of the elasticsearch-rest-client endpoint), or apply a custom HeaderFilterStrategy that blocks these names.

Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.

dbcve analysis · high confidence

The camel-elasticsearch-rest-client component uses unprefixed header names (SEARCH_QUERY, OPERATION, INDEX_NAME, INDEX_SETTINGS, ID) instead of the standard Camel-prefixed format. Since Camel's HttpHeaderFilterStrategy only blocks headers starting with 'Camel', these headers pass through unchanged when using HTTP entry points like platform-http, allowing attackers to override queries and operations to read, delete, or exfiltrate data from Elasticsearch.

MitigationUpgrade to Apache Camel 4.21.0 (or 4.14.8/4.18.3 for LTS streams). Alternatively, strip the affected headers (SEARCH_QUERY, OPERATION, INDEX_NAME, INDEX_SETTINGS, ID) from untrusted inbound messages before they reach the elasticsearch-rest-client endpoint.

Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.

Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.

NVD · CPE data
CamelApplication
Affected:>= 4.3.0, < 4.14.8>= 4.15.0, < 4.18.3>= 4.19.0, < 4.21.0

CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.

From the vector
Attack vector
Network
Complexity
Low
Privileges
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
Low
Integrity
None
Availability
None

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N

Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.

dbcve checks

Work through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.

  1. Identify Apache Camel version
    Run 'camel:version' in Karaf/Console, or check pom.xml for 'org.apache.camel:camel-api' version, or check the Camel distribution version file
    Affected if The installed version falls within >= 4.3.0, < 4.14.8 OR >= 4.15.0, < 4.18.3 OR >= 4.19.0, < 4.21.0
  2. Verify elasticsearch-rest-client component is in use
    Search route definitions (Java, XML, or YAML) for 'elasticsearch-rest-client' in the Camel route builder or check for dependency 'org.apache.camel:camel-elasticsearch-rest-client' in the project build file
    Affected if The camel-elasticsearch-rest-client component is included in the application
  3. Confirm HTTP entry point to elasticsearch endpoint
    Examine Camel route definitions to see if the elasticsearch-rest-client endpoint is reachable via an HTTP entry point such as platform-http, servlet, or other HTTP consumer; inspect the route 'from' endpoints
    Affected if The elasticsearch-rest-client endpoint is exposed via an HTTP entry point like platform-http without header filtering upstream
  4. Inspect header configuration for untrusted inbound messages
    Check the HttpHeaderFilterStrategy configuration and any custom header filters applied before the elasticsearch-rest-client endpoint; look for filters that strip or prefix headers
    Affected if No filter removes or prefixes the headers SEARCH_QUERY, OPERATION, INDEX_NAME, INDEX_SETTINGS, or ID before they reach the elasticsearch-rest-client component

You are affected if your Apache Camel version is within the affected ranges, you use the elasticsearch-rest-client component, and HTTP-accessible routes pass unfiltered inbound headers (SEARCH_QUERY, OPERATION, INDEX_NAME, INDEX_SETTINGS, ID) to the elasticsearch endpoint.

Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.

Check your environment

Paste your version and any relevant configuration and it will be compared against the affected criteria above. Do not include secrets or credentials.

AI-assisted, checked against the advisory. Informational, not a guarantee.

Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.

dbcve · scoped
Upgrade available Upgrade to 4.14.8 / 4.18.3 / 4.21.0 or later
Fixed in 4.14.84.18.34.21.0
Interim mitigation

Upgrade to Apache Camel 4.21.0 (or 4.14.8/4.18.3 for LTS streams). Alternatively, strip the affected headers (SEARCH_QUERY, OPERATION, INDEX_NAME, INDEX_SETTINGS, ID) from untrusted inbound messages before they reach the elasticsearch-rest-client endpoint.

Recommended fix High confidence

4.21.0 (or 4.14.8 for 4.14.x LTS, or 4.18.3 for 4.18.x)

  1. 1. Identify the current Apache Camel version in use by checking your project dependencies (pom.xml, build.gradle, or similar).
  2. 2. Determine which version stream you are on: 4.14.x LTS, 4.18.x, or 4.19.0+.
  3. 3. For 4.14.x LTS users: upgrade Apache Camel to version 4.14.8 or later.
  4. 4. For 4.18.x users: upgrade Apache Camel to version 4.18.3 or later.
  5. 5. For all other affected versions (4.19.0+): upgrade Apache Camel to version 4.21.0 or later.
  6. 6. Update the Maven/Gradle dependency version for camel-elasticsearch-rest-client in your build configuration.
  7. 7. Rebuild and redeploy the application.
  8. 8. Verify that the header constants now use the Camel- prefixed names (CamelElasticsearchId, CamelElasticsearchSearchQuery, CamelElasticsearchIndexSettings, CamelElasticsearchIndexName, CamelElasticsearchOperation).
Caveat Header constant string values are renamed with Camel prefix; update any code referencing these string constants if used directly

Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.

Fix this in Camel Scoped from the published advisory
  • Consultation3.0 h
  • Implementation6.0 h
  • Testing4.0 h
  • Review / QA2.0 h
15.0 hours of engineering $2,640
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References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.

Primary sources

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