CVE-2026-46722
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedThe OOXML parsing of the file indexer does not disable external entity resolution. A crafted xlsx or pptx document placed in an indexed directory can cause local files to be read or outbound HTTP requests to be performed, with the retrieved content being written to the search index.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceThe file indexer's OOXML parser fails to disable XML external entity (XXE) processing, allowing crafted .xlsx or .pptx files to trigger inbound file reads from the local system or outbound HTTP requests to external servers, with the exfiltrated content subsequently written to the search index.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- High
- Authentication
- X
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- X
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify if the file indexer processes OOXML filesSearch configuration files for .xlsx or .pptx file type handlers, or look for OOXML/microsoft-office parser modules. Common locations: indexer config, plugin directories, or registry entries for file type associations.Affected if OOXML file processing is enabled and no XXE protection is configured in the XML parser settings
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Locate the XML parser configuration used by the OOXML parserInspect the indexer configuration or source code for XML parser instantiation. Look for parser settings files, XML processing libraries (javax.xml.parsers, lxml, etc.), or parser configuration sections.Affected if The parser configuration does not explicitly disable external entity resolution (DTD processing, external entity loading, or XInclude support)
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Verify XXE protection settings in the XML parserSearch for parser security settings such as: 'setFeature("http://apache.org/xml/features/disallow-doctype-decl", true)', 'XMLConstants.ACCESS_EXTERNAL_DTD', 'XMLConstants.ACCESS_EXTERNAL_SCHEMA', or similar disable XXE configurations. Check if FEATURE_SECURE_PROCESSING is enabled.Affected if XXE protection features are absent, commented out, or set to allow external entities
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Check if the indexer writes parsed content to a searchable indexVerify that the search index stores or indexes the content extracted from Office documents. Look for index storage directories, Solr/Elasticsearch configurations, or database tables holding indexed document content.Affected if Parsed content from .xlsx/.pptx files is written to the search index without sanitization of exfiltrated data
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Test for XXE vulnerability in a controlled mannerCreate a test .xlsx file with an XXE payload (DOCTYPE with external entity reference to a local file or internal HTTP server). Process it through the indexer and verify if the external resource was accessed or if the entity content appears in search results.Affected if The parser successfully resolves external entities and indexes the retrieved content
The environment is affected if the file indexer processes .xlsx or .pptx files using an XML parser that does not explicitly disable external entity resolution, allowing attacker-controlled files to trigger outbound/inbound requests with exfiltrated content indexed.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataDisable external entity resolution in the OOXML XML parser configuration, or process Office documents in a sandboxed/isolated environment before indexing.
- Consultation4.0 h
- Implementation8.0 h
- Testing6.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2026-46722 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-46722 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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