CVE-2026-47106
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedEllucian Banner Self-Service before the April T2 release (2025-04-23) contains a stored cross-site scripting vulnerability in the course search functionality that allows authenticated Banner ERP users to inject malicious payloads into faculty and course fields by exploiting missing HTML encoding during DOM insertion. An attacker with Banner ERP write access can store malicious JavaScript in fields such as faculty displayName, emailAddress, subjectDescription, or courseTitle; these values are subsequently served unsanitized by the unauthenticated getFacultyMeetingTimes API endpoint, causing arbitrary script execution in the browser of any user who views the affected course's meeting times.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceStored cross-site scripting vulnerability in Ellucian Banner Self-Service where authenticated users with Banner ERP write access can inject malicious JavaScript into faculty fields (displayName, emailAddress) or course fields (subjectDescription, courseTitle). These values are served unsanitized by the unauthenticated getFacultyMeetingTimes API endpoint, causing arbitrary script execution in browsers of users viewing affected course meeting times.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- Low
- User interaction
- Required
- Scope
- Changed
- Confidentiality
- Low
- Integrity
- Low
- Availability
- None
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Check the installed Ellucian Banner Self-Service versionLocate the version number in the application admin panel, system information page, or installation documentation. Compare it against the April T2 2025 release.Affected if The installed version is before the April T2 2025 release and the getFacultyMeetingTimes endpoint is accessible.
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Verify getFacultyMeetingTimes API endpoint accessibilityAttempt to access the getFacultyMeetingTimes API endpoint without authentication using a web browser or HTTP client. Check if the endpoint returns data without requiring login credentials.Affected if The endpoint is accessible without authentication and returns faculty/course data.
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Inspect API response for unsanitized outputCall the getFacultyMeetingTimes endpoint and examine the JSON or HTML response for fields displayName, emailAddress, subjectDescription, and courseTitle. Look for any raw user-supplied content that may contain script tags or HTML elements.Affected if The response contains unescaped HTML or JavaScript in any of the affected fields.
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Confirm write access to affected fields existsLog in as an authenticated user with write access to faculty or course management. Attempt to create or modify records containing displayName, emailAddress, subjectDescription, or courseTitle with test script payloads (e.g., <script>alert(1)</script>).Affected if The system accepts and stores the payload without sanitization.
You are affected if your Banner Self-Service version predates the April T2 2025 release AND the getFacultyMeetingTimes endpoint is exposed and returns unsanitized user-controlled content in displayName, emailAddress, subjectDescription, or courseTitle fields.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scopedApply the vendor April T2 release (2025-04-23) patch. Until patch is available, implement output encoding on the getFacultyMeetingTimes API endpoint and add input validation on all faculty/course field creation interfaces.
Ellucian Banner Self-Service April T2 release (2025-04-23) or later
- Identify current Ellucian Banner Self-Service version by checking the system administration console or Banner ERP version information
- Schedule a maintenance window for the upgrade process
- Verify backup of current Banner Self-Service database and configuration files
- Upgrade Ellucian Banner Self-Service to the April T2 release (2025-04-23) or later using Ellucian's official upgrade procedures
- After upgrade, verify the getFacultyMeetingTimes API endpoint now properly sanitizes HTML entities in faculty displayName, emailAddress, subjectDescription, and courseTitle fields
- Confirm that course search functionality properly encodes output before DOM insertion
- Review Banner ERP user access controls to ensure only authorized personnel have write access to faculty and course fields
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
- Consultation6.0 h
- Implementation12.0 h
- Testing10.0 h
- Review / QA4.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2026-47106 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-47106 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data