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CWE-829Weakness · CWE-829

CVE-2026-47172

CRITICAL · 9.5 CVSS v4.0 Published 2026-06-11
Mitigation only
No fix yet — a mitigation exists. There is no fixed release. A documented workaround reduces exposure in the meantime.
See remediation →
100/100
Remediation priority · Urgent
Remotely reachable No privileges Zero-click

Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.

NVD · unedited
Quest Bot is an opensource modern Discord Bot built for moderation, utilities and support. Prior to version 1.0.3, the repository has a privileged deploy workflow that runs after the unprivileged build workflow completes. The build workflow runs on pull requests, and the deploy workflow checks out the triggering workflow’s head_sha, builds that code into a Docker image, pushes it as latest, and triggers production deployment. If an attacker can open a pull request from a branch named main, the deploy workflow condition can treat the PR build as deployable and build the attacker-controlled commit in a privileged deployment context. This can result in malicious container deployment and production bot compromise. This issue has been patched in version 1.0.3.

Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.

dbcve analysis · high confidence

Quest Bot's CI/CD workflow has an insecure design where a privileged deploy workflow trusts the head_sha from the triggering build workflow. Since the build workflow runs on pull requests, an attacker can open a PR from a branch named 'main' to trick the deploy workflow into treating the PR build as a legitimate deployment, resulting in attacker-controlled code being built into a Docker container and deployed to production.

MitigationUpgrade to version 1.0.3 and modify deploy workflows to only trigger from protected branches (e.g., main after merge) with proper branch protection and code review gates enabled.

Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.

CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.

From the vector
Attack vector
Network
Complexity
Low
Privileges
None
Authentication
X
User interaction
None
Scope
X

CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X

Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.

dbcve checks

Work through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.

  1. Locate the deploy workflow file
    Check the repository for GitHub Actions workflow files, typically in .github/workflows/ directory. Look for workflow files that contain deployment tasks (build, push, deploy actions).
    Affected if A deploy workflow file exists in the repository's .github/workflows/ directory
  2. Inspect workflow trigger conditions
    Open the deploy workflow YAML file and examine the 'on:' section at the top to see which events trigger the workflow.
    Affected if The workflow triggers on 'pull_request' or includes 'pull_request' in its trigger events
  3. Verify head_sha usage without validation
    Search the workflow file for uses of '${{ github.event.pull_request.head.sha }}' or '${{ github.sha }}' being used directly in build or deployment steps without conditional branch validation.
    Affected if The workflow uses head_sha from pull requests in build/deploy steps without filtering by trusted branch names
  4. Check for automatic latest tag pushes
    Search for 'latest' tag in push or docker/build-push-action steps that would tag and push images automatically.
    Affected if The workflow pushes container images with the 'latest' tag based on untrusted (PR-triggered) builds
  5. Review production deployment triggers
    Examine if the workflow deploys to production environments directly from pull request triggers without manual approval or status checks.
    Affected if Production deployment occurs automatically on pull request events without approval gates

You are affected if your Quest Bot deploy workflow triggers on pull requests and builds/deploys using the unvalidated head_sha without requiring approval or branch protection, allowing attacker-controlled code to be pushed as the latest image.

Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.

Check your environment

Paste your version and any relevant configuration and it will be compared against the affected criteria above. Do not include secrets or credentials.

AI-assisted, checked against the advisory. Informational, not a guarantee.

Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.

dbcve · scoped
Mitigation available No clean upgrade yet — mitigate in the meantime
Mitigation

Upgrade to version 1.0.3 and modify deploy workflows to only trigger from protected branches (e.g., main after merge) with proper branch protection and code review gates enabled.

Recommended fix High confidence

version 1.0.3

  1. Upgrade Quest Bot to version 1.0.3 or later
  2. Review GitHub Actions workflow files (.github/workflows/) to ensure deploy workflows only run on trusted branches (e.g., main) and not on pull requests
  3. Implement branch protection rules requiring review before merging to protected branches
  4. Consider adding explicit conditions to deploy workflows to skip execution when triggered by pull request events

Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.

Have this fixed Scoped from the published advisory
  • Consultation2.0 h
  • Implementation3.0 h
  • Testing2.0 h
  • Review / QA1.0 h
8.0 hours of engineering $1,420
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References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.

Primary sources

Practitioner notes

Contributed

Peer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-47172 in production — separate from our analysis above.

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What this is

A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.

What belongs here
  • Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
  • Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
  • No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
  • No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data