CVE-2026-47272
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedpam_usb provides hardware authentication for Linux using ordinary removable media. Prior to 0.9.0, the pusb_pad_compare() function in src/pad.c only verified that the user-side pad (~/.pamusb/device.pad) could be read, but did not enforce that the system-side pad (the pad file on the USB device) was also present and readable. If the user-side pad was deleted or unreadable, the function returned a failure that was treated as non-fatal in certain code paths, allowing authentication to succeed without the USB device being verified. A local user can delete their own ~/.pamusb/device.pad to remove the USB device requirement and authenticate without the physical device. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.9.0.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidencepam_usb versions before 0.9.0 have an authentication bypass vulnerability in the pusb_pad_compare() function in src/pad.c. The function only validated that the user-side pad file (~/.pamusb/device.pad) was readable but failed to enforce that the system-side pad on the physical USB device was also present and accessible. When the user-side pad was deleted or unreadable, certain code paths treated this as a non-fatal error, allowing authentication to succeed without the required USB hardware token.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Local
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- None
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify if pam_usb is installedCheck for pam_usb package using your package manager (e.g., dpkg -l | grep pam_usb, rpm -qa | grep pam_usb, or which pusb_pad_compare)Affected if pam_usb is installed and version is below 0.9.0
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Determine installed pam_usb versionRun version check command for pam_usb (e.g., pam_usb --version, dpkg -s pam-usb, or check /usr/lib/security/pam_usb.so for version metadata)Affected if Version returned is lower than 0.9.0 or version cannot be determined (indicating pre-0.9.0 build)
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Check if pam_usb is configured in PAM stackExamine PAM configuration files in /etc/pam.d/ (common files: system-auth, password-auth, login, sshd, sudo) and /etc/pam.conf for lines containing 'pam_usb' or 'pamusb.so'Affected if pam_usb is present in any PAM configuration file used by authentication services
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Verify user-side pad file locationCheck if ~/.pamusb/device.pad exists and is readable by the target user (ls -la ~/.pamusb/device.pad)Affected if The pad file exists but the vulnerability allows bypass when this file is deleted or unreadable while authentication proceeds anyway
You are affected if pam_usb version is below 0.9.0 AND pam_usb is configured in your PAM authentication stack, allowing authentication to succeed without the physical USB token when the user-side pad file is missing or inaccessible.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scopedUpgrade pam_usb to version 0.9.0 or later, which enforces verification of both user-side and system-side pad files. Alternatively, ensure ~/.pamusb/device.pad files are protected and not deletable by end users.
0.9.0
- 1. Check the currently installed version of pam_usb (e.g., via package manager or by querying the installed package)
- 2. Obtain pam_usb version 0.9.0 or later from the project's GitHub repository or official distribution channels
- 3. Upgrade pam_usb to version 0.9.0 or newer using the appropriate package manager or build process
- 4. Verify the installed version is 0.9.0 or later
- 5. Test that hardware authentication with USB devices functions correctly after the upgrade
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
- Consultation2.0 h
- Implementation1.0 h
- Testing2.0 h
- Review / QA1.0 h
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Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2026-47272 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-47272 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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