CVE-2026-47393
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedPraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. CVE-2026-44338 (GHSA-6rmh-7xcm-cpxj) documents that PraisonAI ships a code-generator (`praisonai.deploy.api.generate_api_server_code`) that emits a Flask API server with authentication disabled by default. Users who follow the documented quickstart (`praisonai deploy --type api`) get a server that binds to `0.0.0.0` per the recommended sample YAML, exposes `/chat` and `/agents` endpoints, runs `praisonai.run()` on user-supplied JSON input — LLM orchestration with the API key materials present in the process environment, and does not require any authentication. Versions prior to 4.6.40 still ship the generator with `auth_enabled` defaulting to `False`. The fix shape is opt-in via `APIConfig(auth_enabled=True, auth_token=...)`. Version 4.6.40 fixes the issue.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidencePraisonAI's code generator creates Flask API servers with authentication disabled by default, binding to 0.0.0.0 and exposing /chat and /agents endpoints that execute user-supplied JSON input while having access to API keys in the process environment, allowing unauthenticated remote attackers to execute arbitrary LLM orchestration with privileged credentials.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify PraisonAI-generated Flask servers in useReview your application deployment and check if any Flask servers were generated by PraisonAI's code-generator. Look for imports like 'from praisonai import' or references to PraisonAI in your codebase.Affected if Flask servers were generated by PraisonAI code-generator and are in use
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Inspect authentication configurationSearch the application code or configuration for the APIConfig settings. Look for auth_enabled parameter - it should be explicitly set to True for secure deployment. Check files like config.py, settings.py, or the main application entry point.Affected if auth_enabled is not set or is set to False (the default insecure setting)
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Verify endpoint exposureCheck if /chat and /agents endpoints are defined and accessible in the Flask application routes. These endpoints handle LLM orchestration.Affected if The /chat or /agents endpoints are exposed and accessible over the network without authentication requirements
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Check for environment API keysReview the deployment environment variables for LLM provider API keys (e.g., OPENAI_API_KEY, ANTHROPIC_API_KEY, etc.). These keys may be present in the process environment when the Flask app runs.Affected if API keys for LLM providers are present in the environment where the Flask app executes and authentication is disabled
You are affected if you deployed a PraisonAI-generated Flask server with the default auth_enabled=False setting and your /chat or /agents endpoints are network-accessible without authentication.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scopedUpgrade to version 4.6.40 or manually enable authentication via APIConfig(auth_enabled=True, auth_token=...) in generated servers.
4.6.40
- Upgrade PraisonAI to version 4.6.40 or later using your package manager (e.g., pip install praisonai>=4.6.40)
- After upgrading, when generating API servers, explicitly enable authentication using APIConfig(auth_enabled=True, auth_token=...) to secure your deployment
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
- Consultation4.0 h
- Implementation4.0 h
- Testing3.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
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Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2026-47393 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-47393 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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