CVE-2026-48203
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedImproper Neutralization of Special Elements in Output Used by a Downstream Component ('Injection'), Improper Input Validation, Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in Apache Camel Solr component. The camel-solr producer copies Exchange message headers whose names begin with the SolrParam. prefix into the parameters of the Solr request, and headers whose names begin with the SolrField. prefix into the fields of the indexed Solr document. The prefix constants (SolrConstants.HEADER_PARAM_PREFIX / HEADER_FIELD_PREFIX) were the plain strings SolrParam. / SolrField.. Because these names do not start with the Camel / camel prefix, HttpHeaderFilterStrategy - which blocks only the Camel header namespace on the HTTP boundary - let them pass from an inbound HTTP request straight into the Exchange. In a route that bridges an HTTP consumer (for example platform-http) into a solr: producer, any HTTP client could therefore set SolrParam.* headers to inject arbitrary Solr request parameters - including shards or stream.url, which cause the Solr server to issue server-side requests to an attacker-chosen URL (server-side request forgery, for example to an internal service or a cloud metadata endpoint), or qt to reach administrative request handlers - and set SolrField.* headers to inject arbitrary fields into indexed documents. No credentials are required when the bridging consumer is unauthenticated. This issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.0.0 before 4.14.8, from 4.15.0 before 4.18.3, from 4.19.0 before 4.21.0. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 4.21.0, which fixes the issue. If users are on the 4.14.x LTS releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.14.8. If users are on the 4.18.x releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.18.3. After upgrading, routes that set Solr parameters or fields via the raw header prefixes must use CamelSolrParam. / CamelSolrField. instead of SolrParam. / SolrField.. For deployments that cannot upgrade immediately, strip the SolrParam.* and SolrField.* headers from any untrusted ingress before the solr: producer, and set the required Solr parameters and fields from a trusted source in the route.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceApache Camel Solr component allows injection of arbitrary Solr request parameters and document fields via HTTP headers with SolrParam.* and SolrField.* prefixes that bypass HttpHeaderFilterStrategy. This enables SSRF attacks through Solr parameters like shards, stream.url, or qt to target internal services, plus arbitrary field injection into indexed documents.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data>= 4.0.0, < 4.14.8>= 4.15.0, < 4.18.3>= 4.19.0, < 4.21.0CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- None
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
-
Check Apache Camel versionLocate the camel-core JAR or pom.xml in your deployment and retrieve the version attribute (for example, run 'mvn dependency:tree' or inspect the JAR manifest).Affected if The installed version falls within >= 4.0.0 and < 4.14.8, OR >= 4.15.0 and < 4.18.3, OR >= 4.19.0 and < 4.21.0.
-
Verify Solr component is in useInspect your project dependencies (pom.xml, build.gradle, or lib directory) for the camel-solr artifact or the org.apache.camel.component.solr package.Affected if The Solr component dependency is present in the classpath.
-
Inspect route definitions for SolrEndpoint usageSearch Java, XML, or YAML route definitions for 'solr:' URIs or SolrComponent/SolrEndpoint bean configurations.Affected if Routes define Solr producers or consumers using the camel-solr component.
-
Check for SolrParam/SolrField header prefixes in route logicSearch codebase for 'SolrParam.' or 'SolrField.' strings in header assignments, message transformations, or HTTP header forwarding logic.Affected if Code passes headers with SolrParam.* or SolrField.* prefixes to the Solr component.
-
Inspect HttpHeaderFilterStrategy configurationLook for HttpHeaderFilterStrategy bean definitions or header filter configurations in your CamelContext setup, and verify whether SolrParam.*/SolrField.* prefixes are explicitly blocked.Affected if HttpHeaderFilterStrategy is not configured to reject SolrParam.* or SolrField.* headers, or these prefixes are permitted.
You are affected if you run a vulnerable Apache Camel version (4.0.0 to 4.14.7, 4.15.0 to 4.18.2, or 4.19.0 to 4.20.x) and your routes use the Solr component with HTTP headers containing SolrParam.* or SolrField.* prefixes.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scoped4.14.84.18.34.21.0
Upgrade to Apache Camel 4.21.0 (or 4.14.8/4.18.3 for LTS streams) and migrate any SolrParam.*/SolrField.* header usage to CamelSolrParam.*/CamelSolrField.* prefixes; alternatively, filter these headers at the ingress point.
Apache Camel 4.21.0 (or 4.14.8 for 4.14.x LTS, or 4.18.3 for 4.18.x)
- Upgrade to Apache Camel 4.21.0 (or 4.14.8 for 4.14.x LTS users, or 4.18.3 for 4.18.x users) to resolve the vulnerability
- After upgrading, update any routes that use SolrParam.* headers to use CamelSolrParam.* instead (e.g., SolrParam.q becomes CamelSolrParam.q)
- After upgrading, update any routes that use SolrField.* headers to use CamelSolrField.* instead (e.g., SolrField.title becomes CamelSolrField.title)
- For deployments unable to upgrade immediately, configure a header filter to strip SolrParam.* and SolrField.* headers from untrusted HTTP ingress before they reach the solr: producer
- If using a bridge between platform-http (or similar HTTP consumer) and solr: producer, ensure authentication is enabled on the HTTP consumer to prevent unauthenticated exploitation
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
- Consultation2.0 h
- Implementation2.0 h
- Testing3.0 h
- Review / QA1.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $2,224.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2026-48203 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-48203 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
Be the first to add a field note for this CVE — a mitigation you’ve verified, a version caveat, or a link to a working fix. Sign in above to contribute.
A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.
- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data