dbcve.org
Path TraversalWeakness · CWE-22

CVE-2026-48716

HIGH · 8.7 CVSS v3.1 Published 2026-06-18
Mitigation only
No fix yet — a mitigation exists. There is no fixed release. A documented workaround reduces exposure in the meantime.
See remediation →
96/100
Remediation priority · Urgent
Remotely reachable No privileges Zero-click

Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.

NVD · unedited
nanobot is a personal AI assistant. In versions 0.1.5.post3 and prior, the WhatsApp bridge in bridge/src/whatsapp.ts constructs a filesystem path using the fileName field from an incoming WhatsApp document message without sanitization. The WhatsApp bridge downloads media attachments and writes them to disk using a filename derived from the sender's message via documentMessage.fileName, which is concatenated with a prefix and its raw value is passed directly to path.join(mediaDir, outFilename). Node.js path.join resolves .. components, allowing an attacker to escape the intended media/ directory by sending a document with a crafted fileName such as ../../../.ssh/authorized_keys. Because the attacker also controls the file content (the downloaded buffer), this is a write-anywhere primitive — both path and content are attacker-controlled. A fix for this issue is planned for version 0.1.5.post4.

Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.

dbcve analysis · high confidence

A path traversal vulnerability exists in nanobot's WhatsApp bridge where the documentMessage.fileName from incoming WhatsApp messages is used directly in path.join() without sanitization. Node.js resolves '..' components, allowing attackers to escape the intended media directory and write files to arbitrary locations on the filesystem by sending crafted filenames like ../../../.ssh/authorized_keys.

MitigationSanitize the fileName input by validating it contains no path traversal sequences (../) or by using path.resolve() to verify the final path remains within the intended media directory before writing files.

Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.

CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.

From the vector
Attack vector
Network
Complexity
High
Privileges
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Changed
Confidentiality
None
Integrity
High
Availability
High

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:H

Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.

dbcve checks

Work through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.

  1. Identify nanobot installation and version
    Run `npm list nanobot` or check package.json to find the installed nanobot version. Compare against any known affected version ranges.
    Affected if nanobot version is within the affected range (if known) or unpatched for this path traversal flaw
  2. Verify WhatsApp bridge is enabled
    Check nanobot configuration files (typically in config/ or a config.json) for WhatsApp bridge settings. Look for enabled: true or similar WhatsApp-related configuration.
    Affected if WhatsApp bridge is enabled and configured to receive messages
  3. Confirm documentMessage handling is active
    Inspect nanobot's WhatsApp bridge code or logs to determine if documentMessage/file attachments are being processed. Check if incoming WhatsApp messages with documents are being handled.
    Affected if The WhatsApp bridge processes incoming documentMessage attachments from WhatsApp users
  4. Inspect media file write location
    Locate the media storage directory configured for nanobot's WhatsApp bridge. Check the configuration for the path where incoming file attachments are saved.
    Affected if Files are written to a configurable directory without path traversal validation on the filename
  5. Check for suspicious files outside media directory
    Audit the filesystem for files written outside the intended media directory, particularly in sensitive locations like .ssh/, home directories, or system directories that could result from path traversal patterns like ../../../.
    Affected if Files exist in locations outside the intended media directory, indicating successful exploitation

If nanobot with an enabled WhatsApp bridge is processing documentMessage attachments from incoming messages, the environment is affected by this path traversal vulnerability.

Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.

Check your environment

Paste your version and any relevant configuration and it will be compared against the affected criteria above. Do not include secrets or credentials.

AI-assisted, checked against the advisory. Informational, not a guarantee.

Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.

dbcve · scoped
Mitigation available No clean upgrade yet — mitigate in the meantime
Mitigation

Sanitize the fileName input by validating it contains no path traversal sequences (../) or by using path.resolve() to verify the final path remains within the intended media directory before writing files.

Recommended fix High confidence

0.1.5.post4

  1. 1. Update nanobot to version 0.1.5.post4 or later when available
  2. 2. Verify the WhatsApp bridge has been updated to sanitize the fileName field before use in path operations
  3. 3. Confirm the fix includes validation that prevents path traversal sequences (..) in filenames

Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.

Have this fixed Scoped from the published advisory
  • Consultation2.0 h
  • Implementation2.0 h
  • Testing3.0 h
  • Review / QA1.0 h
8.0 hours of engineering $1,390
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References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.

Primary sources

Practitioner notes

Contributed

Peer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-48716 in production — separate from our analysis above.

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What this is

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What belongs here
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  • Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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